Santosh K. Ghosh, Monjur Alam, Kundan Kumar, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, D. R. Chowdhury
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引用次数: 13
摘要
栅极掩模是防止AES S- box差分功率分析(DPA)的常用技术之一。然而,由于电路中存在故障,即使是掩模电路也会泄漏侧信道信息。基于这一事实,我们提出了一种平衡的掩码多路复用器,其中输入通过顺序元件或控制与逻辑同步,这可能是防止对AES s - box掩码实现的DPA攻击的可能解决方案。详细的SPICE结果显示支持这样的说法,即修改确实降低了掩码乘法器对DPA攻击的脆弱性。关键词:侧信道攻击,掩码乘法器,AES S-box,差分功率分析
Preventing the Side-Channel Leakage of Masked AES S-Box
Masking of gates is one of the most popular techniques to prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA) of AES S- Boxes. However due to the presence of glitches in circuits even masked circuits leak side-channel information. Moti- vated by this fact, we proposed a balanced masked multi- plier where the inputs are synchronized either by sequential components or controlled AND logic, that can be a possible solution for preventing DPA attack on masked implementa- tion of AES S-Boxes. Detailed SPICE results are shown to support the claim that the modifications indeed reduce the vulnerability of the masked multiplier against DPA attacks. Keywords: Side Channel Attacks, Masked Multiplier, AES S-box, Differential Power Analysis