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Strong Nash Equilibrium in Cournot and Bertrand Oligopolies
This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models. Given the concavity and continuity of payoffs, I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of SNE in these non-cooperative games.
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