已知的未知:网络攻击的必然性

V. Greiman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

正如美国前国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德在他2011年出版的《已知与未知》一书中所描述的那样,“有很多事情是我们完全不知道的——事实上,有些事情是我们如此不知道的,我们甚至不知道我们不知道它们。”纵观历史,世界面临着许多无法预见但事后发现的灾难性事件,包括珍珠港的破坏性影响和9月11日的恐怖袭击。最近,在2020年的太阳风和2021年的殖民管道网络攻击中,灾难性损失的可能性被放大了。我们可能不知道这些事件何时或如何发生,也不知道会造成多大的破坏或破坏,但我们知道这些事件是可能发生的。文献区分了完全意外发生的事件和参与者已经确定可能存在但不知道是否会发生的结果或事件。本文的目的是提供洞察力,基于对网络空间文献内外选定攻击的经验审查,以揭示潜在的风险、不确定性和复杂性,这些风险、不确定性和复杂性可能已经知道,但没有被那些有知识和能力调查警告信号的人认真考虑。本文将在案例分析的基础上,提出不作为的原因以及我们如何从这些经验中吸取教训。研究发现,以下两种理论——制度化和合理化——为增加未被察觉风险可能性的行为的发生提供了一些原因。在本文中,我们通过案例分析来探讨这些理论,并提出了一个由四个概念组成的框架,以提高对这些情况的认识。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Known Unknowns: The Inevitability of Cyber Attacks
As described by Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in his 2011 book, Known and Unknown, “there are many things of which we are completely unaware—in fact, there are things of which we are so unaware, we don’t even know we are unaware of them.  Throughout history the world has faced numerous catastrophic events that were not foreseen but in hindsight were discoverable including the devastating effects of Pearl Harbor, and the September 11 terrorist attacks. More recently, the potential for catastrophic loss has been magnified in the 2020 Solar Winds and 2021 Colonial Pipeline cyber-attacks. We may not know when or how these events will occur or how much damage or destruction will occur, but we do know that these events are possible. The literature differentiates between events that occur totally by surprise, and outcomes or events that actors have identified as possibly existing but do not know whether they will take place or not. The aim of this paper is to provide insight, based on an empirical review of selected attacks both within and outside the cyber space literature to uncover the underlying risk, uncertainty, and complexity that may have been known but not seriously considered by those who had the knowledge and capability to investigate the warning signs. Based on the case study analysis, this paper will present the reasons for inaction and how we can learn from these experiences. The following two theories – institutionalization and rationalization have been found to provide some reasons for the occurrence of behaviors which increase the possibility of unobserved risks. In this paper we explore these theories through case study analysis and  propose a framework consisting of four concepts for increasing awareness of these situations.
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