共同基金业绩、管理团队和董事会

John C. Adams, Takeshi Nishikawa, R. Rao
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引用次数: 47

摘要

最近在共同基金行业,团队管理基金的使用激增,这表明团队管理的好处可能大于成本。然而,现有的经验证据与团队管理的基金相对于个人管理的基金产生更高回报的观点并不一致。我们认为,团队管理的好处很可能在强有力的董事会监督下体现出来,因为团队管理基金内部潜在的搭便车问题得到了缓解。我们的研究发现,规模较小的董事会和独立董事比例较高的董事会与团队管理基金的绩效呈正相关,而与个人管理基金的绩效无关,这与上述观点一致。我们的研究结果表明,在团队管理的基金结构中,存在潜在的搭便车问题,强有力的董事会监督可以改善基金绩效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mutual Fund Performance, Management Teams, and Boards
The recent surge in the use of team-managed funds in the mutual fund industry suggests that the benefits of team management might outweigh its costs. However, extant empirical evidence is not consistent with the view that team-managed funds generate superior returns relative to individual-managed funds. We argue that the benefits of team management are likely to be manifested in the presence of strong board monitoring because the potential free-rider problems within team-managed funds are alleviated. Our findings, that smaller boards and boards with a higher proportion of independent directors are positively associated with performance in team but not individual-managed funds, are consistent with this view. Our results suggest that in team-managed fund structures, where the potential free-riding problems exist, the presence of strong board monitoring improves fund performance.
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