赞助搜索拍卖中的多类别公平性

Christina Ilvento, Meena Jagadeesan, Shuchi Chawla
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引用次数: 30

摘要

广告中的公平性是一个特别值得关注的话题,其动机是计算机科学和经济学文献中的理论和实证观察。我们研究了为许多不同类别的广告商提供服务的通用平台的广告公平性问题。首先,我们从个体公平和嫉妒自由的角度出发,提出了类别间和类别内的公平期望。其次,我们研究了通过满足这些需求的机制可以实现的“平台效用”(分配质量的代理)。更具体地说,我们比较了公平机制的效用与不公平机制的最优,并通过构建表明我们的公平期望与效用是相容的。我们的机制还享有很好的实现属性,包括度量遗忘,这允许平台产生公平分配,而不需要知道公平需求的细节。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Multi-category fairness in sponsored search auctions
Fairness in advertising is a topic of particular concern motivated by theoretical and empirical observations in both the computer science and economics literature. We examine the problem of fairness in advertising for general purpose platforms that service advertisers from many different categories. First, we propose inter-category and intra-category fairness desiderata that take inspiration from individual fairness and envy-freeness. Second, we investigate the "platform utility" (a proxy for the quality of allocation) achievable by mechanisms satisfying these desiderata. More specifically, we compare the utility of fair mechanisms against the unfair optimum, and show by construction that our fairness desiderata are compatible with utility. Our mechanisms also enjoy nice implementation properties including metric-obliviousness, which allows the platform to produce fair allocations without needing to know the specifics of the fairness requirements.
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