公司金融的边际主义革命:1880-1965

Herbert Hovenkamp
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在19世纪末和20世纪初,经济思想的根本变化彻底改变了公司财务理论,导致了其法律法规的变化。这些变化是巨大的,金融分析和法律的这一分支对那些以前从事过它的人来说几乎是认不出来的。这种修正的源头是经济思想中的边际主义或新古典主义革命。古典理论将公司财务视为一种基于古典价值理论并由普通法法院管理的历史的、相对自动执行的调查。相比之下,新古典价值理论是前瞻性的,因此是一种更现实的评估公司价值的方法;但它也受到了更多的预测和解释,因此受到了更多的滥用。这种可能性首先导致各州和后来的联邦政府以监管立法作为回应。虽然边际主义影响了对公司的监管态度的彻底改变,但包括金融在内的公司行为基本理论的变化至少同样引人注目。边际主义革命把公司变成了一个追求价值最大化的理性行为者。新古典公司金融理论毫不含糊地选择边际主义价格理论而不是福利经济学作为其工作假设的来源,从而保证了不仅个人股东而且经理人的无关性。或者换句话说,新古典主义的公司概念不仅仅是将所有权与控制权分开;它将公司决策与所有人类偏好分离开来,除非这些偏好被简单地断言为价值最大化。在新古典主义模型中,股东甚至管理人员的个人身份只有在代理成本的名义下才有意义,而代理成本在新古典主义公司理想中只不过被视为一种不完美。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Marginalist Revolution in Corporate Finance: 1880-1965
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation. The changes were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier. The source of this revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic thought. The classical theory had seen corporate finance as an historical, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of value and administered by common law courts. By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a result a much more realistic way of assessing a corporation's value; but it was also subject to a great deal more prediction and interpretation, and thus to more abuse. That possibility led the states first and later the federal government to respond with regulatory legislation.While marginalism effected a sweeping change in regulatory attitudes toward the corporation, the changes in the basic theory of corporate behavior, including finance, were at least as striking. The marginalist revolution turned the corporation into a rational actor intent on maximizing value. Neoclassical corporate finance theory unambiguously choose marginalist price theory rather than welfare economics as the source of its working assumptions, thus guaranteeing the irrelevance of not only the individual shareholder but also of managers. Or to say it differently, the neoclassical concept of the corporation did not merely separate ownership from control; it separated corporate decision making from all human preference whatsoever, unless those preferences were simply asserted to be maximization of value. Within the neoclassical model the separate human identities of shareholders or even managers came to matter only under the rubric of agency costs, which were regarded as nothing more than an imperfection in the neoclassical corporate ideal.
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