洛克和18世纪思想自然化的计划

C. Wolfe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

洛克是如何为18世纪心智科学的发展做出贡献的,即使他自己似乎拒绝或至少拒绝这样的观点?与后来对经验主义的理解相反,洛克特意指出,他调查和阐明“思想逻辑”的项目不是一个科学项目:“我目前不会干涉心灵的物理考虑”(论文,I.i.2)。洛克进一步指出,这意味着他对心理过程的分析将不涉及大脑的知识(例如,在小体和动物精神方面),尽管他曾是托马斯·威利斯的学生。现在,康德似乎犯了一个基本的错误,考虑到洛克方面如此明确的陈述,当他声称洛克的计划是“理解的生理学”(在《第一批判》a版的序言中)。当然,人们可以问这种理解的生理是什么,以及它是否存在,在洛克的知识世界里或外面(正如我在2016年的一篇论文中试图调查的那样)。这促使我探究他的经验主义对心灵的科学治疗的结果,包括在心灵的“自然化”的意义上(这也暗示了我们对经验主义的理解:安斯蒂对实验哲学和思辨哲学的有影响的区分在这里似乎没有用)。因为如果康德提出这样的指责,那么还有许多18世纪的思想家积极地将洛克视为他们在心理学和相关领域的伟大先驱,其中包括查尔斯·邦纳和约瑟夫·普里斯特利,就像一些著名的医生,如卡巴尼斯,声称“完成了洛克开始的工作”,例如他们的唯物主义激情理论。在这里,人们可能称之为“洛克问题”的是:一个人如何在寻求保持洛克主义的同时,调和经验主义和关于大脑过程的主张?换句话说,什么是归化的过程?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Locke and projects for naturalizing the mind in the 18th century
How does Locke contribute to the development of 18-century projects for a science of the mind, even though he seems to reject or at least bracket off such an idea himself? Contrary to later understandings of empiricism, Locke goes out of his way to state that his project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2). Locke further specifies that this means his analysis of mental processes will not engage with knowledge of the brain (e.g. in terms of corpuscles and animal spirits), even though he had been the student of Thomas Willis. Now, Kant seemed to make an elementary mistake, given such a clear statement on Locke’s part, when he claimed that Locke’s project was a “physiology of the understanding” (in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique). One can ask of course what this physiology of the understanding was, and if it existed, in or out of the Lockean intellectual world (as I have sought to investigate in a 2016 paper). This leads me to inquire into the outcome of his empiricism for a scientific treatment of the mind, including in the sense of a ‘naturalization’ of the mind (with implications also for our understanding of empiricism: Anstey’s influential distinction between experimental and speculative philosophy does not seem useful here). Because if Kant made this charge, there were also many 18century thinkers who positively treated Locke as their great forerunner in psychology and related fields: Charles Bonnet and Joseph Priestley among them, just as some prominent physicians such as Cabanis claimed to be ‘finishing the job’ that Locke had started in, e.g. their materialist theories of the passions. What one might term ‘the Locke Problem’ here is: how can one reconcile empiricism and claims about cerebral processes, while seeking to remain a Lockean? Differently put, what is the process of naturalization, a naturalization of?
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