Іmpact乌克兰-俄罗斯战争对全球贸易与发展的实证研究

M. Singh, Helga Sárközy, S. Singh, Zoltán Zéman
{"title":"Іmpact乌克兰-俄罗斯战争对全球贸易与发展的实证研究","authors":"M. Singh, Helga Sárközy, S. Singh, Zoltán Zéman","doi":"10.58423/2786-6742/2022-1-80-92","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The crisis in Ukraine has created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions and has also dealt a severe blow to the globe economy. The brunt of the suffering and destruction are being felt by the people of Ukraine themselves but the prices in terms of reduced trade and output are likely to be felt by people round the world through higher food and energy prices and reduced availability of products exported by Russia and Ukraine. Poorer countries are at high risk from the war, since they have a tendency to spend a bigger fraction of their incomes on food compared to wealthier countries, this might impact huge political stability globally. From a macroeconomic perspective, higher prices for food and energy will reduce real incomes and depress global import demand. Sanctions will impose economic costs on not only Russia directly but also on its trading partners. Besides Russia and Ukraine, depressed gross domestic product (GDP) will probably be seen mostly in Europe given the region’s geographic proximity and its dependence on Russian energy. Trade costs will rise within the near term because of extraordinary sanctions, export restrictions, higher energy costs and transport disruptions furthermore. As a result, the impact of the war will wear world interchange 2022 might be greater than the impact on global GDP. While shares of Russia and Ukraine in world trade and output are relatively small, they're important suppliers of essential products, notably food and energy. Both countries accounted for 2.5 percent in world merchandise trade and 1.9 per cent in world GDP in 2021. Yet they supplied around 25 per cent of wheat, 15 per cent of barley and 45 per cent of sunflower products exports in 2019. Russia alone accounted for 9.4 percent of world trade fuels, including a 20 per cent share in fossil fuel exports. Many countries are highly obsessed on food imports from Russia and Ukraine. for instance, over 1/2 wheat imports in Egypt, the Lebanon and Tunisia come from Russia and Ukraine. Other countries are more addicted to imports of fuels from Russia, like Finland (63 percent) and Turkey (35 percent). Russia and Ukraine also are key providers of inputs into industrial value chains. Russia is one in all the most suppliers globally of palladium and rhodium, key inputs within the production of catalytic converters within the automotive sector and therefore the manufacture of semiconductors. Semiconductor production also depends to a considerable extent on neon supplied by Ukraine, which further provides variety of low-tech products to the ecu automobile value chain, like wire harnesses. Prolonged disruptions within the supply of those goods could harm the recovery of automobile manufacturing. Sanctions are already having a robust impact on Russia’s economy, with possible medium to long-term consequences. Disconnecting Russian banks from the SWIFT settlement system and blocking Russia’s use of interchange reserves have triggered a pointy depreciation of the ruble, reducing real incomes within the country. Most of the massive international firms also are abandoning the Russian market. Oil and gas exports have yet to be strongly full of the sanctions, but the crisis could accelerate the worldwide transition towards greener energy sources. Longstanding economic relationships are disrupted by the war and by the sanctions imposed in its wake. Eminent economists have simulated various scenarios parenthetically the channels through which trade may well be affected and to explore possible short-run and long-run effects. Global trade growth is projected to slow by up to 2.2 percentage points in 2022. long term impacts could even be large and consequential. there's a risk that trade could become more fragmented in terms of blocs supported geopolitics. whether or not no formal blocs emerge, private actors might prefer to minimize risk by reorienting supply chains. this might reduce global GDP within the long term by about 5 percent, notably by restricting competition and stifling innovation (WTO, 2022). The Global Economy has a crucial role to play in mitigating the negative effects of the crisis and in rebuilding a post-war global economy. Keeping markets open are critical to confirm that economic opportunities remain receptive all countries. this can be very true within the post-war period, when businesses and families will have to repair their balance sheets and rebuild their lives. Through its importance for international trade and its monitoring, convening and other functions, the WTO is central to making sure that international trade continues to serve billions of individuals across the globe. during this paper we are giving an empirical analysis of world trade and development impacted by the present Russian-Ukraine war.","PeriodicalId":106282,"journal":{"name":"Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis. Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Іmpact of Ukraine-Russia war on global trade and development: an empirical study\",\"authors\":\"M. Singh, Helga Sárközy, S. Singh, Zoltán Zéman\",\"doi\":\"10.58423/2786-6742/2022-1-80-92\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The crisis in Ukraine has created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions and has also dealt a severe blow to the globe economy. The brunt of the suffering and destruction are being felt by the people of Ukraine themselves but the prices in terms of reduced trade and output are likely to be felt by people round the world through higher food and energy prices and reduced availability of products exported by Russia and Ukraine. Poorer countries are at high risk from the war, since they have a tendency to spend a bigger fraction of their incomes on food compared to wealthier countries, this might impact huge political stability globally. From a macroeconomic perspective, higher prices for food and energy will reduce real incomes and depress global import demand. Sanctions will impose economic costs on not only Russia directly but also on its trading partners. Besides Russia and Ukraine, depressed gross domestic product (GDP) will probably be seen mostly in Europe given the region’s geographic proximity and its dependence on Russian energy. Trade costs will rise within the near term because of extraordinary sanctions, export restrictions, higher energy costs and transport disruptions furthermore. As a result, the impact of the war will wear world interchange 2022 might be greater than the impact on global GDP. While shares of Russia and Ukraine in world trade and output are relatively small, they're important suppliers of essential products, notably food and energy. Both countries accounted for 2.5 percent in world merchandise trade and 1.9 per cent in world GDP in 2021. Yet they supplied around 25 per cent of wheat, 15 per cent of barley and 45 per cent of sunflower products exports in 2019. Russia alone accounted for 9.4 percent of world trade fuels, including a 20 per cent share in fossil fuel exports. Many countries are highly obsessed on food imports from Russia and Ukraine. for instance, over 1/2 wheat imports in Egypt, the Lebanon and Tunisia come from Russia and Ukraine. Other countries are more addicted to imports of fuels from Russia, like Finland (63 percent) and Turkey (35 percent). Russia and Ukraine also are key providers of inputs into industrial value chains. Russia is one in all the most suppliers globally of palladium and rhodium, key inputs within the production of catalytic converters within the automotive sector and therefore the manufacture of semiconductors. Semiconductor production also depends to a considerable extent on neon supplied by Ukraine, which further provides variety of low-tech products to the ecu automobile value chain, like wire harnesses. Prolonged disruptions within the supply of those goods could harm the recovery of automobile manufacturing. Sanctions are already having a robust impact on Russia’s economy, with possible medium to long-term consequences. Disconnecting Russian banks from the SWIFT settlement system and blocking Russia’s use of interchange reserves have triggered a pointy depreciation of the ruble, reducing real incomes within the country. Most of the massive international firms also are abandoning the Russian market. Oil and gas exports have yet to be strongly full of the sanctions, but the crisis could accelerate the worldwide transition towards greener energy sources. Longstanding economic relationships are disrupted by the war and by the sanctions imposed in its wake. Eminent economists have simulated various scenarios parenthetically the channels through which trade may well be affected and to explore possible short-run and long-run effects. Global trade growth is projected to slow by up to 2.2 percentage points in 2022. long term impacts could even be large and consequential. there's a risk that trade could become more fragmented in terms of blocs supported geopolitics. whether or not no formal blocs emerge, private actors might prefer to minimize risk by reorienting supply chains. this might reduce global GDP within the long term by about 5 percent, notably by restricting competition and stifling innovation (WTO, 2022). The Global Economy has a crucial role to play in mitigating the negative effects of the crisis and in rebuilding a post-war global economy. Keeping markets open are critical to confirm that economic opportunities remain receptive all countries. this can be very true within the post-war period, when businesses and families will have to repair their balance sheets and rebuild their lives. Through its importance for international trade and its monitoring, convening and other functions, the WTO is central to making sure that international trade continues to serve billions of individuals across the globe. during this paper we are giving an empirical analysis of world trade and development impacted by the present Russian-Ukraine war.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106282,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis. Economics\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis. Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.58423/2786-6742/2022-1-80-92\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta Academiae Beregsasiensis. Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.58423/2786-6742/2022-1-80-92","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

乌克兰危机造成了一场规模巨大的人道主义危机,也对全球经济造成了严重打击。乌克兰人民自己感受到苦难和破坏的冲击,但贸易和产出减少的价格可能会通过食品和能源价格上涨以及俄罗斯和乌克兰出口产品的可用性减少而被世界各地的人们感受到。较贫穷的国家受到战争的高风险,因为与较富裕的国家相比,他们倾向于将收入的更大一部分用于食品,这可能会对全球的政治稳定产生巨大影响。从宏观经济角度看,食品和能源价格上涨将减少实际收入,抑制全球进口需求。制裁不仅会让俄罗斯直接付出经济代价,还会让其贸易伙伴付出经济代价。除了俄罗斯和乌克兰,考虑到欧洲的地理位置和对俄罗斯能源的依赖,该地区的国内生产总值(GDP)可能主要出现低迷。由于特别制裁、出口限制、能源成本上升以及运输中断,贸易成本将在短期内上升。因此,2022年战争对世界交换的影响可能大于对全球GDP的影响。虽然俄罗斯和乌克兰在世界贸易和产出中的份额相对较小,但它们是重要产品的重要供应国,尤其是食品和能源。2021年,两国占世界商品贸易的2.5%,占世界GDP的1.9%。然而,2019年,它们提供了约25%的小麦、15%的大麦和45%的向日葵产品出口。仅俄罗斯就占世界燃料贸易的9.4%,其中化石燃料出口占20%。许多国家都非常痴迷于从俄罗斯和乌克兰进口食品。例如,埃及、黎巴嫩和突尼斯超过一半的小麦进口来自俄罗斯和乌克兰。其他国家更依赖于从俄罗斯进口燃料,比如芬兰(63%)和土耳其(35%)。俄罗斯和乌克兰也是工业价值链投入品的主要供应国。俄罗斯是全球钯和铑的主要供应国之一,钯和铑是汽车行业催化转化器生产的关键原料,因此也是半导体制造的关键原料。半导体生产也在很大程度上依赖乌克兰供应的霓虹灯,这进一步为ecu汽车价值链提供了各种低技术产品,如线束。这些商品供应的长期中断可能会损害汽车制造业的复苏。制裁已经对俄罗斯经济产生了强烈影响,可能产生中长期后果。切断俄罗斯银行与SWIFT结算系统的联系,并阻止俄罗斯使用外汇储备,已引发卢布大幅贬值,减少了俄罗斯国内的实际收入。大多数大型国际公司也正在放弃俄罗斯市场。石油和天然气出口尚未完全受到制裁,但这场危机可能会加速全球向更环保能源的过渡。长期的经济关系被战争和随之而来的制裁所破坏。著名的经济学家已经模拟了各种可能影响贸易的渠道,并探讨了可能的短期和长期影响。预计2022年全球贸易增长将放缓至多2.2个百分点。长期的影响甚至可能是巨大而深远的。就集团支持的地缘政治而言,贸易可能会变得更加分散。无论是否会出现正式的集团,私人行为者可能更愿意通过重新调整供应链来将风险降到最低。这可能会在长期内使全球GDP减少约5%,特别是通过限制竞争和扼杀创新(WTO, 2022年)。全球经济在减轻危机的负面影响和重建战后全球经济方面可发挥关键作用。保持市场开放对于确保所有国家都能接受经济机会至关重要。这在战后时期是非常真实的,企业和家庭将不得不修复他们的资产负债表,重建他们的生活。通过其对国际贸易的重要性及其监督、召集和其他职能,世贸组织在确保国际贸易继续为全球数十亿人服务方面发挥着核心作用。本文对当前俄乌战争对世界贸易和发展的影响进行了实证分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Іmpact of Ukraine-Russia war on global trade and development: an empirical study
The crisis in Ukraine has created a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions and has also dealt a severe blow to the globe economy. The brunt of the suffering and destruction are being felt by the people of Ukraine themselves but the prices in terms of reduced trade and output are likely to be felt by people round the world through higher food and energy prices and reduced availability of products exported by Russia and Ukraine. Poorer countries are at high risk from the war, since they have a tendency to spend a bigger fraction of their incomes on food compared to wealthier countries, this might impact huge political stability globally. From a macroeconomic perspective, higher prices for food and energy will reduce real incomes and depress global import demand. Sanctions will impose economic costs on not only Russia directly but also on its trading partners. Besides Russia and Ukraine, depressed gross domestic product (GDP) will probably be seen mostly in Europe given the region’s geographic proximity and its dependence on Russian energy. Trade costs will rise within the near term because of extraordinary sanctions, export restrictions, higher energy costs and transport disruptions furthermore. As a result, the impact of the war will wear world interchange 2022 might be greater than the impact on global GDP. While shares of Russia and Ukraine in world trade and output are relatively small, they're important suppliers of essential products, notably food and energy. Both countries accounted for 2.5 percent in world merchandise trade and 1.9 per cent in world GDP in 2021. Yet they supplied around 25 per cent of wheat, 15 per cent of barley and 45 per cent of sunflower products exports in 2019. Russia alone accounted for 9.4 percent of world trade fuels, including a 20 per cent share in fossil fuel exports. Many countries are highly obsessed on food imports from Russia and Ukraine. for instance, over 1/2 wheat imports in Egypt, the Lebanon and Tunisia come from Russia and Ukraine. Other countries are more addicted to imports of fuels from Russia, like Finland (63 percent) and Turkey (35 percent). Russia and Ukraine also are key providers of inputs into industrial value chains. Russia is one in all the most suppliers globally of palladium and rhodium, key inputs within the production of catalytic converters within the automotive sector and therefore the manufacture of semiconductors. Semiconductor production also depends to a considerable extent on neon supplied by Ukraine, which further provides variety of low-tech products to the ecu automobile value chain, like wire harnesses. Prolonged disruptions within the supply of those goods could harm the recovery of automobile manufacturing. Sanctions are already having a robust impact on Russia’s economy, with possible medium to long-term consequences. Disconnecting Russian banks from the SWIFT settlement system and blocking Russia’s use of interchange reserves have triggered a pointy depreciation of the ruble, reducing real incomes within the country. Most of the massive international firms also are abandoning the Russian market. Oil and gas exports have yet to be strongly full of the sanctions, but the crisis could accelerate the worldwide transition towards greener energy sources. Longstanding economic relationships are disrupted by the war and by the sanctions imposed in its wake. Eminent economists have simulated various scenarios parenthetically the channels through which trade may well be affected and to explore possible short-run and long-run effects. Global trade growth is projected to slow by up to 2.2 percentage points in 2022. long term impacts could even be large and consequential. there's a risk that trade could become more fragmented in terms of blocs supported geopolitics. whether or not no formal blocs emerge, private actors might prefer to minimize risk by reorienting supply chains. this might reduce global GDP within the long term by about 5 percent, notably by restricting competition and stifling innovation (WTO, 2022). The Global Economy has a crucial role to play in mitigating the negative effects of the crisis and in rebuilding a post-war global economy. Keeping markets open are critical to confirm that economic opportunities remain receptive all countries. this can be very true within the post-war period, when businesses and families will have to repair their balance sheets and rebuild their lives. Through its importance for international trade and its monitoring, convening and other functions, the WTO is central to making sure that international trade continues to serve billions of individuals across the globe. during this paper we are giving an empirical analysis of world trade and development impacted by the present Russian-Ukraine war.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信