数据市场:一个算法解决方案

Anish Agarwal, M. Dahleh, Tuhin Sarkar
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引用次数: 151

摘要

在这项工作中,我们的目标是设计一个数据市场;一个强大的实时匹配机制,有效地购买和出售机器学习任务的训练数据。虽然数据和预训练模型的货币化是当今行业的一个重要焦点,但目前还没有一个市场机制来为训练数据定价,并在解决相关(计算和其他)复杂性的同时,将买家和卖家匹配起来。创建这样一个市场的挑战源于数据作为一种资产的本质:(i)它可以自由复制;(ii)其值由于与其他数据中的信号相关而具有固有的组合性;(iii)预测任务和准确度值差异很大;(iv)如果不首先将训练数据应用于预测任务,则很难先验地验证训练数据的有用性。作为我们的主要贡献,我们:(i)提出了一个双边数据市场的数学模型,并正式定义了关键的相关挑战;(ii)构建这样一个市场运行的算法,并分析它们如何应对所定义的挑战。我们强调了两项技术贡献:(1)提供免费复制商品的合作游戏所需的“公平”新概念;(ii)基于Myerson支付函数和乘法权重算法的拍卖一类组合商品的真实、零后悔机制。这些可能是独立的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution
In this work, we aim to design a data marketplace; a robust real-time matching mechanism to efficiently buy and sell training data for Machine Learning tasks. While the monetization of data and pre-trained models is an essential focus of industry today, there does not exist a market mechanism to price training data and match buyers to sellers while still addressing the associated (computational and other) complexity. The challenge in creating such a market stems from the very nature of data as an asset: (i) it is freely replicable; (ii) its value is inherently combinatorial due to correlation with signal in other data; (iii) prediction tasks and the value of accuracy vary widely; (iv) usefulness of training data is difficult to verify a priori without first applying it to a prediction task. As our main contributions we: (i) propose a mathematical model for a two-sided data market and formally define the key associated challenges; (ii) construct algorithms for such a market to function and analyze how they meet the challenges defined. We highlight two technical contributions: (i) a new notion of "fairness" required for cooperative games with freely replicable goods; (ii) a truthful, zero regret mechanism to auction a class of combinatorial goods based on utilizing Myerson's payment function and the Multiplicative Weights algorithm. These might be of independent interest.
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