{"title":"的主题","authors":"D. Beaver","doi":"10.1163/9789004487222_006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper concerns the relevance of notions of sentence topic and discourse topic to the analysis of sentences containing presuppositions. Firstly I consider sentences where quantificational determiners quantify-in to presuppositions. By considering texts containing such sentences, I show that intermediate accommodation cannot be triggered by presuppositions, contrary to the predictions of van der Sandt’s recent model. However, a process I refer to as topical accommodation could justify the existence of the readings predicted by van der Sandt’s model in some cases. I then show that similar problems occur in the treatment of presuppositions occurring in the consequents of conditionals, and once again conclude that current models err by not taking into account topic-focus articulation and issues of discourse coherency. 1 The Naive Informant How is a naive informant to guess what the relevant topic of conversation is when presented with a decontextualised single sentence example? The mysteriousness of the way in which people “make up a context” for such examples is generally recognised to be problematic for standard linguistic methodology. When we come to studying aspects of meaning which specifically concern the previous context — I would call all such aspects of meaning presuppositional — the problem becomes acute. The question of what a sentence presupposes becomes a question of what propositions hold in normal contexts of utterance of the sentence. But what does normal mean? The standard tests for presupposition are doubly problematic in this respect. Although the informant is asked about implications and not presuppositions, two sentences rather than one are involved (eg. a sentence and its negation). That the informant is asked about implications cannot disguise the fact that they are presuppositionally derived, that what we are really after is propositions that may be presumed to hold in normal contexts of utterance. Only now we are concerned with normal contexts of utterance of two sentences, and not one. Again, what is a normal context of utterance? Exactly what ceteris have to be paribus across the contexts of utterance for the two example sentences? I will suggest that it is vitally important to consider explicitly the discourse contexts in which presuppositional example sentences occur. 2 Presupposition and Quantification I now want to draw attention to one particular aspect of the elegant theory of presupposition presented in [van der Sandt 92], namely the way in which presuppositions can trigger quantificational domain restriction, or something like it. I will argue that this aspect of the theory is not sustainable once the relevance of discourse context to the interpretation of example sentences is taken into account. Consider the following example: E1 Every German woman drives to work in her car. According to conventional wisdom, the NP her car carries a presupposition of car ownership. Exactly what happens to this presupposition in a case like E1, when, on the reading I am interested in, it is bound by a quantifier, is a moot point. Van der Sandt proposes that in order for the sentence to be understood, the presupposition must be accommodated, in something like the sense of [Lewis 79]. People’s tastes in accommodation vary. Since van der Sandt houses presuppositions in boxes designed by Kamp, the well known Dutch representationalist, the process of accommodating a presupposed proposition becomes a matter of moving the representations of presuppositions from box to box. A suitable box must be found somewhere along the accessibility path leading up to the presuppositional expression. The notion of accessibility is just that of [Kamp 81], whilst the details of exactly what is a suitable box for a presupposition has been discussed by van der Sandt at length, mostly in terms of his correctness conditions on DRS’s. I will not comment on these correctness conditions, but merely note one requirement van der Sandt places on accommodation: a proposition free in some discourse marker can only be accommodated in a location from where the marker is already accessible. Rather than considering accommodation in the abstract, let us look at a concrete example: the boxes that can be built to represent E1. After resolution of the possessive pronoun her, something like the following DRS is built, where a presupposed DRS is distinguished by its extra thick walls:","PeriodicalId":448521,"journal":{"name":"Context-Dependence in the Analysis of Linguistic Meaning","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"20","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Accommodating Topics\",\"authors\":\"D. Beaver\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/9789004487222_006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper concerns the relevance of notions of sentence topic and discourse topic to the analysis of sentences containing presuppositions. Firstly I consider sentences where quantificational determiners quantify-in to presuppositions. By considering texts containing such sentences, I show that intermediate accommodation cannot be triggered by presuppositions, contrary to the predictions of van der Sandt’s recent model. However, a process I refer to as topical accommodation could justify the existence of the readings predicted by van der Sandt’s model in some cases. I then show that similar problems occur in the treatment of presuppositions occurring in the consequents of conditionals, and once again conclude that current models err by not taking into account topic-focus articulation and issues of discourse coherency. 1 The Naive Informant How is a naive informant to guess what the relevant topic of conversation is when presented with a decontextualised single sentence example? The mysteriousness of the way in which people “make up a context” for such examples is generally recognised to be problematic for standard linguistic methodology. When we come to studying aspects of meaning which specifically concern the previous context — I would call all such aspects of meaning presuppositional — the problem becomes acute. The question of what a sentence presupposes becomes a question of what propositions hold in normal contexts of utterance of the sentence. But what does normal mean? The standard tests for presupposition are doubly problematic in this respect. Although the informant is asked about implications and not presuppositions, two sentences rather than one are involved (eg. a sentence and its negation). That the informant is asked about implications cannot disguise the fact that they are presuppositionally derived, that what we are really after is propositions that may be presumed to hold in normal contexts of utterance. Only now we are concerned with normal contexts of utterance of two sentences, and not one. Again, what is a normal context of utterance? Exactly what ceteris have to be paribus across the contexts of utterance for the two example sentences? I will suggest that it is vitally important to consider explicitly the discourse contexts in which presuppositional example sentences occur. 2 Presupposition and Quantification I now want to draw attention to one particular aspect of the elegant theory of presupposition presented in [van der Sandt 92], namely the way in which presuppositions can trigger quantificational domain restriction, or something like it. I will argue that this aspect of the theory is not sustainable once the relevance of discourse context to the interpretation of example sentences is taken into account. Consider the following example: E1 Every German woman drives to work in her car. According to conventional wisdom, the NP her car carries a presupposition of car ownership. Exactly what happens to this presupposition in a case like E1, when, on the reading I am interested in, it is bound by a quantifier, is a moot point. Van der Sandt proposes that in order for the sentence to be understood, the presupposition must be accommodated, in something like the sense of [Lewis 79]. People’s tastes in accommodation vary. Since van der Sandt houses presuppositions in boxes designed by Kamp, the well known Dutch representationalist, the process of accommodating a presupposed proposition becomes a matter of moving the representations of presuppositions from box to box. A suitable box must be found somewhere along the accessibility path leading up to the presuppositional expression. The notion of accessibility is just that of [Kamp 81], whilst the details of exactly what is a suitable box for a presupposition has been discussed by van der Sandt at length, mostly in terms of his correctness conditions on DRS’s. I will not comment on these correctness conditions, but merely note one requirement van der Sandt places on accommodation: a proposition free in some discourse marker can only be accommodated in a location from where the marker is already accessible. Rather than considering accommodation in the abstract, let us look at a concrete example: the boxes that can be built to represent E1. 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引用次数: 20
摘要
本文探讨了句子主题和语篇主题的概念与包含预设的句子分析的相关性。首先,我考虑量词限定词与预设相关联的句子。通过考虑包含这类句子的文本,我表明,与范德桑特最近模型的预测相反,中间适应不能由预设触发。然而,在某些情况下,我称之为局部适应的过程可以证明范德桑特模型预测的读数的存在。然后,我表明,在处理条件句结果中出现的预设时,也会出现类似的问题,并再次得出结论,当前模型的错误在于没有考虑主题焦点表达和话语连贯问题。当面对一个脱离语境的单句例子时,一个天真的举报人是如何猜测对话的相关话题的?人们为这些例子“编造语境”的神秘方式通常被认为是标准语言学方法论的问题。当我们开始研究意义的各个方面,特别是与之前的语境有关的时候——我把所有这些意义的方面都称为预设的——这个问题就变得尖锐了。一个句子以什么为前提的问题变成了一个命题在句子的正常语境中持有什么命题的问题。但是正常是什么意思呢?在这方面,假定的标准检验有双重问题。虽然举报人被问及的是暗示而不是预设,但涉及的是两个句子而不是一个句子。一个句子及其否定)。提示者被问及暗示并不能掩盖这样一个事实,即它们是预先推导出来的,我们真正追求的是在正常的话语语境中可能被假定成立的命题。只是现在我们关心的是两个句子的正常语境,而不是一个句子。再说一次,什么是正常的话语语境?在这两个例句的语境中,究竟哪些中心词必须是对等的?我建议明确地考虑假设例句出现的话语语境是至关重要的。我现在想提请大家注意在[van der Sandt 92]中提出的优雅的预设理论的一个特定方面,即预设可以触发量化域限制的方式,或类似的东西。我认为,一旦考虑到话语语境与例句解释的相关性,理论的这一方面是不可持续的。考虑下面的例子:每个德国女人都开车去上班。根据传统的智慧,NP她的车带有一个汽车所有权的前提。在像E1这样的情况下,这个假设到底发生了什么,在我感兴趣的阅读中,它被一个量词所束缚,这是一个有争议的问题。Van der Sandt提出,为了让句子被理解,必须在某种意义上适应预设[Lewis 79]。人们对住宿的品味各不相同。由于van der Sandt将预设放置在由著名的荷兰表征主义者Kamp设计的盒子中,因此容纳预设命题的过程就变成了将预设的表征从一个盒子移动到另一个盒子的问题。必须在通向预设表达式的可访问性路径上找到一个合适的框。可访问性的概念只是[Kamp 81]的概念,而van der Sandt详细讨论了什么是一个预设的合适盒子,主要是根据他对DRS的正确性条件。我不会评论这些正确性条件,但只注意van der Sandt对容纳的一个要求:在某些话语标记中自由的命题只能被容纳在标记已经可以访问的位置。与其抽象地考虑适应性,不如让我们来看一个具体的例子:可以用来表示E1的盒子。在解决了所有格代词her之后,就建立了如下的DRS,其中预设的DRS以其额外的厚壁为特征:
This paper concerns the relevance of notions of sentence topic and discourse topic to the analysis of sentences containing presuppositions. Firstly I consider sentences where quantificational determiners quantify-in to presuppositions. By considering texts containing such sentences, I show that intermediate accommodation cannot be triggered by presuppositions, contrary to the predictions of van der Sandt’s recent model. However, a process I refer to as topical accommodation could justify the existence of the readings predicted by van der Sandt’s model in some cases. I then show that similar problems occur in the treatment of presuppositions occurring in the consequents of conditionals, and once again conclude that current models err by not taking into account topic-focus articulation and issues of discourse coherency. 1 The Naive Informant How is a naive informant to guess what the relevant topic of conversation is when presented with a decontextualised single sentence example? The mysteriousness of the way in which people “make up a context” for such examples is generally recognised to be problematic for standard linguistic methodology. When we come to studying aspects of meaning which specifically concern the previous context — I would call all such aspects of meaning presuppositional — the problem becomes acute. The question of what a sentence presupposes becomes a question of what propositions hold in normal contexts of utterance of the sentence. But what does normal mean? The standard tests for presupposition are doubly problematic in this respect. Although the informant is asked about implications and not presuppositions, two sentences rather than one are involved (eg. a sentence and its negation). That the informant is asked about implications cannot disguise the fact that they are presuppositionally derived, that what we are really after is propositions that may be presumed to hold in normal contexts of utterance. Only now we are concerned with normal contexts of utterance of two sentences, and not one. Again, what is a normal context of utterance? Exactly what ceteris have to be paribus across the contexts of utterance for the two example sentences? I will suggest that it is vitally important to consider explicitly the discourse contexts in which presuppositional example sentences occur. 2 Presupposition and Quantification I now want to draw attention to one particular aspect of the elegant theory of presupposition presented in [van der Sandt 92], namely the way in which presuppositions can trigger quantificational domain restriction, or something like it. I will argue that this aspect of the theory is not sustainable once the relevance of discourse context to the interpretation of example sentences is taken into account. Consider the following example: E1 Every German woman drives to work in her car. According to conventional wisdom, the NP her car carries a presupposition of car ownership. Exactly what happens to this presupposition in a case like E1, when, on the reading I am interested in, it is bound by a quantifier, is a moot point. Van der Sandt proposes that in order for the sentence to be understood, the presupposition must be accommodated, in something like the sense of [Lewis 79]. People’s tastes in accommodation vary. Since van der Sandt houses presuppositions in boxes designed by Kamp, the well known Dutch representationalist, the process of accommodating a presupposed proposition becomes a matter of moving the representations of presuppositions from box to box. A suitable box must be found somewhere along the accessibility path leading up to the presuppositional expression. The notion of accessibility is just that of [Kamp 81], whilst the details of exactly what is a suitable box for a presupposition has been discussed by van der Sandt at length, mostly in terms of his correctness conditions on DRS’s. I will not comment on these correctness conditions, but merely note one requirement van der Sandt places on accommodation: a proposition free in some discourse marker can only be accommodated in a location from where the marker is already accessible. Rather than considering accommodation in the abstract, let us look at a concrete example: the boxes that can be built to represent E1. After resolution of the possessive pronoun her, something like the following DRS is built, where a presupposed DRS is distinguished by its extra thick walls: