经典竞争法评价标准的演进:数字市场挑战下对捆绑的法律评价

Mateusz Musielak
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摘要

本文对绑带法律评估的评价标准进行了详细的综述。这种做法构成滥用支配地位,严重违反竞争法。这种滥用的机制是基于利用一种产品的市场支配力来创造能够排除优秀竞争对手解决方案竞争的大量产品。当一种产品(“捆绑产品”)只与另一种产品(“捆绑产品”)一起销售时,就会发生捆绑。在大多数情况下,打结是为了巩固公司在打结产品市场上的主导地位,通常是为了将打结产品的庞大客户群与不太受欢迎的产品共享。然而,打情骂俏本身并不违法。在许多情况下,它不会导致任何反竞争的担忧,而且可能对消费者有利。这就是为什么必须按照普遍适用的基于效果的方法仔细评价这种行为的每次评估,并特别注意其效果,以及潜在的效率。对判例法和文献的分析揭示了对捆绑行为进行法律评估的基本机制。但是,如果不使这些机制适应技术发展所引起的持续变化,就不可能使用这些机制。数字市场不仅创造了增量收入,而且还是新的或不同寻常的法律安排的来源。更常见的情况是,如果没有新的行为,现有的规定将无法准确地处理每一种新的做法。《数字市场法》旨在使现有法律框架适应当代市场现实,并成为在数字市场上执行竞争法规则的现代工具。欧盟委员会(European Commission)正寻求扩大其权力,以便在企业影响市场竞争之前尽早进行干预。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Evolution of Classical Evaluation Standards in Competition Law: The Legal Assessment of Tying in View of Challenges Raised by Digital Markets
This paper provides a detailed review of evaluation standards for the legal assessment of tying. This practice, which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, is a significant breach of competition law. The mechanism of this type of abuse is based on taking advantage of market power in the supply of one product to create packed offerings capable of precluding competition from superior rival solutions. Tying occurs when one product, the “tying product”, is sold only with another product, the “tied product”. In the prevailing number of cases, tying serves to consolidate the company’s dominant position on the tied product market, which usually aims to share the tying product’s large customer group with the less-desired product. However, tying is not illegal per se. In many cases, it does not lead to any anti-competitive concerns, and might be beneficial for consumers. This is why each assessment of this conduct must be carefully evaluated with special attention given to the effects, in accordance with the generally applied effect-based approach, and also potential efficiencies. An analysis of the case-law and literature reveals the basic mechanisms for conducting a legal assessment of tying. However, the use of these mechanisms will not be possible without their adaptation to the ongoing changes caused by technological development. Digital markets not only generate incremental revenues, but are also the sources of new or unusual legal arrangements. It will more frequently be the case that existing provisions will not be able to address every new practice accurately without new acts. The Digital Markets Act aims to adapt the existing legal framework to contemporary market realities and to become a modern tool for enforcing competition law rules on digital markets. The European Commission is seeking to broaden its powers to intervene at the earliest possible stage, before an undertaking affects the competition on a market.
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