碳限额与交易机制下考虑消费者双重偏好的生鲜农产品供应链协调

Yang Yang, G. Yao
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引用次数: 9

摘要

为了实现“碳中和”发展的目标,在碳配额交易政策、消费者对生鲜农产品的偏好和低碳偏好条件下,本文讨论了两级生鲜农产品供应链的均衡决策问题。并引入了成本分担合同和两部分定价合同来协调供应链。结果表明:生鲜农产品供应商的保鲜低碳努力与消费者偏好、保鲜成本、低碳成本、保鲜碳排放因子、减碳效率有关;在一定条件下,成本分担合同和两部分定价合同都能协调生鲜农产品供应链;在给定成本和碳减排效率的情况下,合同零售商的选择取决于消费者的消费偏好和供应商的初始碳排放规模;当两个合同都有效时,零售商选择两部分定价合同更有利;碳交易价格越高,对供应商保鲜努力和低碳努力的激励效果越好。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fresh agricultural products supply chain coordination considering consumers' dual preferences under carbon cap-and-trade mechanism
In order to achieve the goal of "carbon neutral" development, under the conditions of carbon quota trading policy, consumers' preference for fresh agricultural products and low-carbon preference, this paper discusses the equilibrium decision-making problem of a two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain. And the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract are introduced to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: the fresh-keeping and low-carbon efforts made by fresh produce suppliers are related to consumers' preferences, fresh-keeping costs, low-carbon costs, fresh-keeping carbon emission factors, and carbon reduction efficiency; under certain conditions, both the cost sharing contract and the two-part pricing contract can coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products; given certain costs and carbon reduction efficiency, which contract retailers choose depends on consumers' consumption preferences and the size of the supplier's initial carbon emissions; when both contracts are valid, it is more advantageous for the retailer to choose two-part pricing contract; the higher the carbon trading price, the better the incentive effect on suppliers' fresh-keeping efforts and low-carbon efforts.
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