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引用次数: 4
摘要
A. $\mathrm{M}+1$ st-price auction是一种所有竞标者同时出价的拍卖方式，出价最高的竞标者以$M+$ 1的出价购买$M$相同的商品。以往的研究主要采用可信第三方(TTP)、可信混合服务器和诚实管理者。我们首次提出了一种高效、安全的拍卖协议，该协议在没有任何管理器和http的情况下保证了财务的公平性、鲁棒性和正确性，并且在恶意模型下是安全的。我们还提出了一个核实投标的新机制。这种新机制可用于所有基于加密比特的拍卖协议。
A. $\mathrm{M}+1$ st-price auction is an auction method in which all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the $M$ highest bidders purchase $M$ identical goods at the $M+$ 1st bidding price. Previous researches use trusted third party (TTP), trusted mix server, and honest managers. We propose an efficient and secure auction protocol that guarantees financial fairness, robustness and correctness without any manager or TTP and is secure under malicious model for the first time. We also proposed a new mechanism to verify bids. This new mechanism can be used in all auction protocols which is based on encrypted bits.
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