J. B. Heaton, J. B. Heaton, É. Fontenay, M. Gross, D. Heath, Ashley C. Keller, Tom Miles
{"title":"杀卡默:没有垃圾科学的证券诉讼","authors":"J. B. Heaton, J. B. Heaton, É. Fontenay, M. Gross, D. Heath, Ashley C. Keller, Tom Miles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3410446","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science concerning market efficiency. This Article explains why and suggests a way out. In its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud on the market presumption for securities traded in an efficient market. Faced with the task of determining market efficiency, courts throughout the nation embraced the ad hoc speculations of a first-mover district court that proclaimed, in Cammer v. Bloom, how to allege (and presumably prove) facts that would do just that. The Cammer court’s analysis did not rely on financial economics for its notions, but instead regurgitated the assertions of a single plaintiff’s expert affidavit – from a securities law professor, not a financial economist – and a securities law treatise equally uninformed by the relevant field. The result has been 30 years of junk science in securities adjudication. This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory from its pre-efficient-markets-hypothesis roots through a brief “gilding the lily” phase where an appeal to social science results on market efficiency was only an ancillary, bolstering argument for already-sufficient precedent for the fraud on the market presumption, to the requirement that litigants plead and prove efficiency using indicia with no support in financial economics. The way out of this embarrassing state of affairs is to return to the roots of fraud on the market in the non-technical notion of “a free and open public market” that inquires only whether the market for the security at issue is open to active buyers and sellers and is not subject to substantial seller lockups or bans on short selling. It is reasonable to presume that prices in such free and open public markets can be distorted by fraud, a presumption that is then rebuttable by establishing (1) that the alleged fraud in fact had no price impact; (2) that there are substantial limits on the ability of active investors to buy and sell in the market, such that the market is not a “free and open public” one; or (3) that the plaintiff would have made their purchase or sale at the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all controlling Supreme Court opinions.","PeriodicalId":286147,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kill Cammer: Securities Litigation Without Junk Science\",\"authors\":\"J. B. Heaton, J. B. Heaton, É. Fontenay, M. Gross, D. Heath, Ashley C. Keller, Tom Miles\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3410446\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science concerning market efficiency. This Article explains why and suggests a way out. In its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud on the market presumption for securities traded in an efficient market. Faced with the task of determining market efficiency, courts throughout the nation embraced the ad hoc speculations of a first-mover district court that proclaimed, in Cammer v. Bloom, how to allege (and presumably prove) facts that would do just that. The Cammer court’s analysis did not rely on financial economics for its notions, but instead regurgitated the assertions of a single plaintiff’s expert affidavit – from a securities law professor, not a financial economist – and a securities law treatise equally uninformed by the relevant field. The result has been 30 years of junk science in securities adjudication. This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory from its pre-efficient-markets-hypothesis roots through a brief “gilding the lily” phase where an appeal to social science results on market efficiency was only an ancillary, bolstering argument for already-sufficient precedent for the fraud on the market presumption, to the requirement that litigants plead and prove efficiency using indicia with no support in financial economics. The way out of this embarrassing state of affairs is to return to the roots of fraud on the market in the non-technical notion of “a free and open public market” that inquires only whether the market for the security at issue is open to active buyers and sellers and is not subject to substantial seller lockups or bans on short selling. It is reasonable to presume that prices in such free and open public markets can be distorted by fraud, a presumption that is then rebuttable by establishing (1) that the alleged fraud in fact had no price impact; (2) that there are substantial limits on the ability of active investors to buy and sell in the market, such that the market is not a “free and open public” one; or (3) that the plaintiff would have made their purchase or sale at the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all controlling Supreme Court opinions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":286147,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-08-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410446\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Corporate & Financial Law: Interdisciplinary Approaches eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410446","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
证券诉讼是市场效率垃圾科学的温床。本文解释了原因,并提出了一条出路。在1988年Basic诉Levinson案的判决中,最高法院认可了在有效市场中交易证券的市场假设欺诈。面对确定市场效率的任务,全国各地的法院都接受了先发地区法院的特别推测,该法院在Cammer v. Bloom一案中宣布了如何指控(并可能证明)能够做到这一点的事实。Cammer法院的分析并没有以金融经济学作为其观点的依据,而是反证了单个原告的专家宣誓书的主张——来自一位证券法教授,而不是金融经济学家——以及一篇同样不了解相关领域的证券法论文。其结果就是30年来证券裁决中的垃圾科学。本文追溯了市场欺诈理论的发展,从其有效市场假说的根源,通过一个短暂的“给百合花镀金”阶段,在这个阶段,对市场效率的社会科学结果的呼吁只是一个辅助的,支持市场欺诈假设已经有足够的先例的论点,到诉讼当事人使用没有金融经济学支持的指标来辩护和证明效率的要求。摆脱这种尴尬状态的方法是回到市场欺诈的根源,即“自由开放的公共市场”的非技术概念,该概念只询问有关证券的市场是否对活跃的买家和卖家开放,并且不受大量卖家锁定或卖空禁令的约束。我们可以合理地假设,在这种自由和开放的公共市场上,价格可能会因欺诈而扭曲,这一假设可以通过确立(1)所谓的欺诈实际上没有价格影响来反驳;(2)对活跃投资者在市场上买卖的能力存在实质性限制,使得市场不是“自由开放的公共市场”;或者(3)原告即使知道所指控的虚假陈述是虚假的,也会以受影响的价格进行购买或销售。这一提法与最高法院的所有主导意见一致。
Kill Cammer: Securities Litigation Without Junk Science
Securities litigation is a hotbed of junk science concerning market efficiency. This Article explains why and suggests a way out. In its 1988 decision in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud on the market presumption for securities traded in an efficient market. Faced with the task of determining market efficiency, courts throughout the nation embraced the ad hoc speculations of a first-mover district court that proclaimed, in Cammer v. Bloom, how to allege (and presumably prove) facts that would do just that. The Cammer court’s analysis did not rely on financial economics for its notions, but instead regurgitated the assertions of a single plaintiff’s expert affidavit – from a securities law professor, not a financial economist – and a securities law treatise equally uninformed by the relevant field. The result has been 30 years of junk science in securities adjudication. This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory from its pre-efficient-markets-hypothesis roots through a brief “gilding the lily” phase where an appeal to social science results on market efficiency was only an ancillary, bolstering argument for already-sufficient precedent for the fraud on the market presumption, to the requirement that litigants plead and prove efficiency using indicia with no support in financial economics. The way out of this embarrassing state of affairs is to return to the roots of fraud on the market in the non-technical notion of “a free and open public market” that inquires only whether the market for the security at issue is open to active buyers and sellers and is not subject to substantial seller lockups or bans on short selling. It is reasonable to presume that prices in such free and open public markets can be distorted by fraud, a presumption that is then rebuttable by establishing (1) that the alleged fraud in fact had no price impact; (2) that there are substantial limits on the ability of active investors to buy and sell in the market, such that the market is not a “free and open public” one; or (3) that the plaintiff would have made their purchase or sale at the affected price even knowing of the falsity of the alleged misrepresentation. This formulation is consistent with all controlling Supreme Court opinions.