独裁政权真的存在吗?

Alejandro Quiroz Flores
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引用次数: 0

摘要

选择理论解释了政治领导人任期的变化。更具体地说,它解释了为什么制定“好”政策的领导人只能在短期内执政,而制定“坏”政策的领导人却能掌权数十年。本章概述了选择制理论,讨论了选择制理论的核心政治制度,包括选择制和获胜联盟,并详细阐述了威权治理在其中的地位。特别是,这一章使用选择理论来分析专制制度,并解释为什么专制领导人实施不同的政策来获得和保持必要的政治支持,以最大限度地延长任期。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are There Really Dictatorships?
Selectorate theory explains variation in political leaders’ tenure in office. More specifically, it explains why leaders who produce “good” policies stay in office for short periods of time while leaders who deliver “bad” policy can hold on to power for decades. This chapter presents an overview of selectorate theory, discusses the political institutions that lie at the center of it, including the selectorate and the winning coalition, and elaborates on the place that authoritarian governance has in it. In particular, the chapter uses selectorate theory to analyze autocracies and explains why autocratic leaders implement different sets of policies to obtain and keep the political support necessary to maximize tenure in office.
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