Patrycja Klusak, M. Kraemer, Huong Vu
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摘要

利用2000年1月至2019年1月期间由三大信用评级机构(CRA),标准普尔,穆迪和惠誉评级的102个主权国家,我们首次证明了先发评级机构(标准普尔)在下调评级时陷入了商业陷阱。也就是说,先发评级机构(S&P)每将主权信用评级下调一级,主权客户取消评级合同的可能性就会增加2.4%。标普在一个月内下调的评级越多,相对于穆迪,它们的主权评级覆盖范围就越小。我们对小型主权借款人的评级下调比对大型主权借款人的评级下调更为明显。本文探讨了文献的三个主题之间的相互作用:评级机构之间的羊群行为,利益冲突问题和评级质量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
First-mover Disadvantage: The Sovereign Ratings Mousetrap
Using 102 sovereigns rated by the three largest credit rating agencies (CRA), S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between January 2000 and January 2019, we are the first to document that the first- mover CRA (S&P) in downgrades falls into a commercial trap. Namely, each sovereign downgrade by one notch by the first-mover CRA (S&P) results in 2.4% increase in the probability of a rating contract being cancelled by the sovereign client. The more downgrades S&P makes in a given month, the more their sovereign rating coverage falls relative to Moody’s. Our results are more pronounced for downgrades on small sovereign borrowers than on large sovereign borrowers. This paper explores the interaction between three themes of the literature: herding behaviour amongst CRAs, issues of conflict of interest and ratings quality.
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