非对称寻租竞争中的内生产权、冲突强度与不平等

A. Yarkin
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引用次数: 1

摘要

财富分配不平等的减少是否意味着更好的产权保护?在本文中,我们表明这种影响不是单调的,并且取决于a)均衡类型:冲突(寻租)或和平,b)财富分配变化的原因,以及c)统治阶级“精英”的规模。在冲突阶段,制度质量正依赖于精英阶层的财富,负依赖于精英阶层的规模。然而,从冲突过渡到和平阶段(没有寻租和快速增长)需要减少不平等。这就产生了一个制度性陷阱。此外,寻租行为的强度随着财富的再分配和统治阶级的扩大而增加。我们的研究结果可以描述财富分配的特征,其中最好是重新分配财富或扩大统治阶级,以改善制度和限制寻租动机
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Endogenous Property Rights, Conflict Intensity and Inequality in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contest
Does less inequality in wealth distribution imply better property rights protection? In this paper we show that this impact is non monotonous and is conditional on a) equilibrium type: conflict (rent-seeking) or peace, b) the reasons of changes in wealth distribution, and c) the size of the ruling class, “elite”. In the conflict stage, institutional quality positively depends on the wealth of the elite, but negatively – on the size of the elite class. However, the transition from conflict to peace stage (with no rent-seeking and fast growth) requires the reduction of inequality. This generates an institutional trap. Moreover, the intensity of rent-seeking behavior increases both with progressive redistribution of wealth and with widening of the ruling class. Our results allow characterizing wealth distributions, wherein it is better to redistribute wealth or to expand the ruling class in order to improve institutions and limit rent-seeking incentives
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