CEO薪酬激励和安全行事:来自FAS 123R的证据

Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-27 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3774070

N. Carline, O. Pryshchepa, Bo Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文使用FAS 123R法规来检验CEO薪酬激励的减少如何影响管理层的“安全行事”行为。通过使用反映有意的管理努力来改变企业风险的代理，差异中差异检验表明，受影响的企业大幅降低了系统风险和特殊风险，导致企业总风险下降8%。这些风险的降低是通过转移到更安全，但低q的部分，同时关闭风险更高的部分来实现的，而投资水平没有显著变化。我们的研究结果表明，当没有其他激励或治理机制补偿时，期权补偿所提供的冒险激励减少，加剧了风险相关的代理问题。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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CEO Compensation Incentives and Playing It Safe: Evidence from FAS 123R

This paper uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives
affects managerial `playing-it-safe' behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts
to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both
systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in
risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Q segments while closing the riskier ones, without
significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking
incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or
governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem.

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Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal

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