{"title":"南亚的稳定-不稳定悖论、误解与升级控制","authors":"M. Krepon","doi":"10.1515/9781503625037-010","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"he United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict. International relations and deterrence theorists aptly described this tense standoff in which much blood and treasure was expended—but without direct conflict—as the “stability-instability paradox.”","PeriodicalId":277982,"journal":{"name":"Prospects for Peace in South Asia","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"35","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"10 The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation-Control in South Asia\",\"authors\":\"M. Krepon\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9781503625037-010\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"he United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict. International relations and deterrence theorists aptly described this tense standoff in which much blood and treasure was expended—but without direct conflict—as the “stability-instability paradox.”\",\"PeriodicalId\":277982,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Prospects for Peace in South Asia\",\"volume\":\"42 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-03-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"35\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Prospects for Peace in South Asia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503625037-010\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Prospects for Peace in South Asia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503625037-010","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
10 The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation-Control in South Asia
he United States and the Soviet Union managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict. International relations and deterrence theorists aptly described this tense standoff in which much blood and treasure was expended—but without direct conflict—as the “stability-instability paradox.”