意识和机器人感知:对我的评论者的回应

P. Haikonen
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我要感谢Raul Arrabales、Peter Boltuc、Ron Chrisley、Eva Hudlicka、Ricardo Sanz和Murray Shanahan对我的书《意识和机器人感知》的专家评论。我感到很荣幸有这么多知名的专家花时间来表达他们的宝贵意见,我非常感激。我还要感谢IJMC总编辑安东尼奥·切拉(Antonio Chella)给我这个机会对这些评论发表评论。Raul Arrabales和Ron Chrisley都指出了我的观点,在这本书中,意识的问题得到了解释,而不是回避。当然,这里存在一定的怀疑。然而,我的目的是说,在我的书中,我解释了意识的真正问题是什么。很自然地,这是一个难题,感知为什么以及如何出现在我们面前,因为它们导致了"现象的内心世界"或者任何你想用的描述。我在这里的方法是把这个问题带到治疗的焦点,这是你在许多其他关于这个主题的实用书籍中没有看到的方法。在解释了问题是什么之后,我接着提出了解决这个问题的可能途径。任何地方都没有声称问题在这里完全解决了。Peter Boltuc指出我误解了他关于意识功能的观点。我应该向你道歉。试图准确地引用别人的观点,尤其是精简别人的观点,往往是危险和愚蠢的。(我也想向默里·沙纳汉和伯纳德·巴尔斯道歉,如果他们也和我在处理他们的全球工作空间架构方面的一些缺点一样的话。)如果这能让你感到安慰的话,我自己的作品在很多方面经常被误解。)我的观点是,意识是感知的内在表象,因为这是《国际机器意识杂志》第6卷第1期(2014)71-74 #.c世界科学出版公司DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400125
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Consciousness and Robot Sentience: A Response to My Reviewers
I would like to thank Raul Arrabales, Peter Boltuc, Ron Chrisley, Eva Hudlicka, Ricardo Sanz and Murray Shanahan for their expert reviews of my book \Consciousness and Robot Sentience" [Haikonen, 2012]. I feel °attered that so many eminent and well-known experts have taken the e®ort to express their valued opinions, which I humbly appreciate very much. I also want to thank the IJMC Editor-in-Chief, Antonio Chella for kindly o®ering me the chance to comment on these reviews. Raul Arrabales and also Ron Chrisley point out my claim that in this book the problem of consciousness is explained, not explained away. Certain scepticism is in order here, naturally. However, my purpose was to say that in my book I explained, what the real problem of consciousness is. And it is, naturally, the hard problem, why and how percepts appear to us as they do leading to the \phenomenal inner world" or whatever description you might wish to use. My approach here is to bring this problem to the focus of the treatment, an approach that you do not nd in many other (if any) practical books on this topic. Having thus explained what the problem is, I proceed to propose possible avenues for nding solution to this problem. It is not claimed anywhere that the problems are fully solved here. Peter Boltuc points out that I have misconstrued his position on the functions of consciousness. I owe an apology here. It is always dangerous and di±cult to try to cite and especially condense others' ideas accurately. (I wish to extend this apology also to Murray Shanahan and Bernard Baars, should they also nd some shortcomings in my treatment of their global workspace architectures. If it is of any consolation, my own writings are more often than not misconstrued in many ways.) My view is that consciousness is the internal appearance of percepts, because this and nothing else is International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 6, No. 1 (2014) 71–74 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400125
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