{"title":"罗马和现代奴隶制的概念","authors":"Rose Dayanne Santos de Brito","doi":"10.46793/upk20.975s","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Roman law was accused of legitimizing slavery in ancient times and individualism in modernity. This article seeks to refute these anti-historical formulations. For this, it adopts the ontological difference between Celso’s Roman conception (law as the art of the good and the just) and Kelsen’s modern one (law as a set of norms). The distinctions between the legal regime of slavery in ancient society and modernity will be analyzed from an exercise of the history of law, based on the synchronic and diachronic method. Finally, Roman law appears as an instrument of criticism in order to confront legal institutes of private bourgeois law.","PeriodicalId":395751,"journal":{"name":"USLUGE i prava korisnika","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ROMAN AND MODERN CONCEPT OF SLAVERY\",\"authors\":\"Rose Dayanne Santos de Brito\",\"doi\":\"10.46793/upk20.975s\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Roman law was accused of legitimizing slavery in ancient times and individualism in modernity. This article seeks to refute these anti-historical formulations. For this, it adopts the ontological difference between Celso’s Roman conception (law as the art of the good and the just) and Kelsen’s modern one (law as a set of norms). The distinctions between the legal regime of slavery in ancient society and modernity will be analyzed from an exercise of the history of law, based on the synchronic and diachronic method. Finally, Roman law appears as an instrument of criticism in order to confront legal institutes of private bourgeois law.\",\"PeriodicalId\":395751,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"USLUGE i prava korisnika\",\"volume\":\"43 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"USLUGE i prava korisnika\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.46793/upk20.975s\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"USLUGE i prava korisnika","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46793/upk20.975s","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Roman law was accused of legitimizing slavery in ancient times and individualism in modernity. This article seeks to refute these anti-historical formulations. For this, it adopts the ontological difference between Celso’s Roman conception (law as the art of the good and the just) and Kelsen’s modern one (law as a set of norms). The distinctions between the legal regime of slavery in ancient society and modernity will be analyzed from an exercise of the history of law, based on the synchronic and diachronic method. Finally, Roman law appears as an instrument of criticism in order to confront legal institutes of private bourgeois law.
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