A Not-So-Special Relationship America and Britain

The Brexiteers presented a revived partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of Britain’s new Anglosphere-centered diplomacy. Without the United States, any Anglosphere project would lose meaning, and the future of Britain outside the European Union would be grim. But this chapter argues that the focus on the “special relationship” was based on a delusional national myth. Historically, the specialness, which discounted an enormous gap in terms of power and influence between the two countries, has been more keenly felt in London than in Washington. Since 1945, America’s absolute strength and Britain’s relative weakness has always determined a highly unbalanced relationship. In the eyes of Dean Acheson—Secretary of State in the Truman Administration—British rhetoric surrounding the “special” connection between the two countries reflected nothing more than the UK’s unwillingness to accept its post-imperial status: that of a simple transatlantic intermediary and Anglo-Saxon balancer in European affairs. It has been observed that, from 1945 onwards, the “special relationship” rapidly assumed the character of a “special dependancy”, with Britain being very much the junior partner. Currently, the difference in terms of power and influence between the two countries is as great as in the past—if not even greater, given Britain’s diminished influence in European affairs. On top of that, bridging the policy inconsistencies between “America First” (based on unilateralism and protectionism) and “Global Britain” (based on multilateralism and free markets) might represent an insurmountable obstacle.