精神障碍作为一种疾病:Szasz重访

Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye
{"title":"精神障碍作为一种疾病:Szasz重访","authors":"Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye","doi":"10.18662/lumenss/11.2/69","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Szasz was a psychiatrist with great intellectual sagacity, consistent and unwavering with his concept of mental illness. He famously argues that mental illness is a myth. If Szasz's arguments are prima facie propositions and mental health interventions are considered myth-making endeavors, psychopharmacological engagement during treatment might be the most unjustified coercion of this generation. For Szasz, mental disorders are in the realm of psycho-social-ethical-legal. He views the existing treatment model of mental illness as an ideological validation of coercion. This tension in his findings stems from two angles, the exclusion of bodily illness dynamics that is currently unknown and extreme activities that are not considered illnesses. Call this the value-ladenness of the mental disorder proposition.\nI maintain that this proposition fails to show the polythetic nature of mental disorders. Specifically, I aver that the value-ladenness proposition on which his theory is predicated requires that we deny the emergent anatomical-physiological factual norms that plausibly can exist, namely knowledge of brain structures and functions in neuroscience. I claim that such knowledge can emerge. Howbeit, Szasz's framework is partially valid when he admits the psychosocial features of mental disorders due to the value-ladenness of mental disorders. I will consolidate this partial validity with a position accordant with realist philosophy drawing from Foucault, Fulford, and Kendell solidified by the evidence of cognitive-affective science within the domain of contemporary ampliative understanding of mental conditions to answer the questions raised by Szasz's proposition.","PeriodicalId":203824,"journal":{"name":"Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty: Social Sciences","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mental Disorder as an Illness: Szasz Revisited\",\"authors\":\"Abiola Bamijoko-Okungbaye\",\"doi\":\"10.18662/lumenss/11.2/69\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Thomas Szasz was a psychiatrist with great intellectual sagacity, consistent and unwavering with his concept of mental illness. He famously argues that mental illness is a myth. If Szasz's arguments are prima facie propositions and mental health interventions are considered myth-making endeavors, psychopharmacological engagement during treatment might be the most unjustified coercion of this generation. For Szasz, mental disorders are in the realm of psycho-social-ethical-legal. He views the existing treatment model of mental illness as an ideological validation of coercion. This tension in his findings stems from two angles, the exclusion of bodily illness dynamics that is currently unknown and extreme activities that are not considered illnesses. Call this the value-ladenness of the mental disorder proposition.\\nI maintain that this proposition fails to show the polythetic nature of mental disorders. Specifically, I aver that the value-ladenness proposition on which his theory is predicated requires that we deny the emergent anatomical-physiological factual norms that plausibly can exist, namely knowledge of brain structures and functions in neuroscience. I claim that such knowledge can emerge. Howbeit, Szasz's framework is partially valid when he admits the psychosocial features of mental disorders due to the value-ladenness of mental disorders. I will consolidate this partial validity with a position accordant with realist philosophy drawing from Foucault, Fulford, and Kendell solidified by the evidence of cognitive-affective science within the domain of contemporary ampliative understanding of mental conditions to answer the questions raised by Szasz's proposition.\",\"PeriodicalId\":203824,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty: Social Sciences\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-12-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty: Social Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.18662/lumenss/11.2/69\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logos Universality Mentality Education Novelty: Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18662/lumenss/11.2/69","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

托马斯·萨兹是一位精神科医生,他的思想非常睿智,他对精神疾病的概念始终如一,毫不动摇。他著名的观点是,精神疾病是一个神话。如果Szasz的论点是初步的命题,而心理健康干预被认为是制造神话的努力,那么在治疗期间的精神药理学参与可能是这一代人中最不合理的强迫。对Szasz来说,精神障碍属于心理-社会-伦理-法律领域。他认为现有的精神疾病治疗模式是对强迫的意识形态认可。他的发现中的这种紧张源于两个角度,排除了目前未知的身体疾病动态和不被认为是疾病的极端活动。把这叫做精神障碍命题的价值负荷。我坚持认为,这一命题未能显示精神障碍的综合性质。具体地说,我认为他的理论所依据的价值负荷命题要求我们否认可能存在的新兴解剖-生理事实规范,即神经科学中关于大脑结构和功能的知识。我认为这样的知识是可以出现的。然而,当Szasz承认精神障碍的社会心理特征时,由于精神障碍的价值负荷性,他的框架是部分有效的。我将巩固这个部分的有效性,与福柯、富尔福德和肯德尔的现实主义哲学相一致,通过当代对精神状况的扩展理解领域内的认知情感科学的证据来巩固这个立场,以回答Szasz的命题提出的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mental Disorder as an Illness: Szasz Revisited
Thomas Szasz was a psychiatrist with great intellectual sagacity, consistent and unwavering with his concept of mental illness. He famously argues that mental illness is a myth. If Szasz's arguments are prima facie propositions and mental health interventions are considered myth-making endeavors, psychopharmacological engagement during treatment might be the most unjustified coercion of this generation. For Szasz, mental disorders are in the realm of psycho-social-ethical-legal. He views the existing treatment model of mental illness as an ideological validation of coercion. This tension in his findings stems from two angles, the exclusion of bodily illness dynamics that is currently unknown and extreme activities that are not considered illnesses. Call this the value-ladenness of the mental disorder proposition. I maintain that this proposition fails to show the polythetic nature of mental disorders. Specifically, I aver that the value-ladenness proposition on which his theory is predicated requires that we deny the emergent anatomical-physiological factual norms that plausibly can exist, namely knowledge of brain structures and functions in neuroscience. I claim that such knowledge can emerge. Howbeit, Szasz's framework is partially valid when he admits the psychosocial features of mental disorders due to the value-ladenness of mental disorders. I will consolidate this partial validity with a position accordant with realist philosophy drawing from Foucault, Fulford, and Kendell solidified by the evidence of cognitive-affective science within the domain of contemporary ampliative understanding of mental conditions to answer the questions raised by Szasz's proposition.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信