中国央企薪酬改革方案与成本粘性

Xiaoxue Cao, Wenjing Dong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2015年1月1日,中央企业实施了《中央企业负责人薪酬改革方案》(以下简称《改革方案》)。该计划的实施引发了薪酬激励制度的诸多变化。本文以2012 - 2016年在沪深交易所上市的央企为样本,考察了改革方案对成本粘性的影响。研究发现:(1)改革方案实施后,央企成本粘性显著下降;(2)这一关系受管理层持股和股东股权集中度的影响。在管理层持股比例较高、股东股权集中度较低的情况下,改革方案对成本粘性的抑制作用更为显著。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Compensation Reform Plan and Cost Stickiness of Central Enterprises in China
The central enterprises of China had enforced Compensation Reform Plan for Central Enterprise Responsible Persons (Reform Plan in short) in January 1st, 2015. The enforcement of this plan had initiated a lot of changes on compensation incentive system. Using the sample of central enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges from 2012 to 2016, this paper examines the effect of the Reform Plan on cost stickiness. The paper finds: (1) after the Reform Plan, the cost stickiness of central enterprises drops significantly; (2) this relationship is affect by management ownership and ownership concentration of shareholders. While the management ownership is high and ownership concentration of shareholders is low, the Reform Plan restrains cost stickiness is more significantly.
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