{"title":"自由意志主义的自我所有权保护自由吗?","authors":"Jesper Ahlin Marceta","doi":"10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.227119","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nMany libertarians assume that there is a close relation between an individual’s self-ownership and her freedom. That relation needs questioning. In this article it is argued that, even in a pre-property state, self-ownership is insufficient to protect freedom. Therefore, libertarians who believe in self-ownership should either offer a defense of freedom that is independent from their defense of self-ownership, make it explicit that they hold freedom as second to self-ownership (and defend that position), or reconsider the moral basis of their political views.\n","PeriodicalId":325276,"journal":{"name":"De Ethica","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does Libertarian Self-Ownership Protect Freedom?\",\"authors\":\"Jesper Ahlin Marceta\",\"doi\":\"10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.227119\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nMany libertarians assume that there is a close relation between an individual’s self-ownership and her freedom. That relation needs questioning. In this article it is argued that, even in a pre-property state, self-ownership is insufficient to protect freedom. Therefore, libertarians who believe in self-ownership should either offer a defense of freedom that is independent from their defense of self-ownership, make it explicit that they hold freedom as second to self-ownership (and defend that position), or reconsider the moral basis of their political views.\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":325276,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"De Ethica\",\"volume\":\"79 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"De Ethica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.227119\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"De Ethica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.227119","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Many libertarians assume that there is a close relation between an individual’s self-ownership and her freedom. That relation needs questioning. In this article it is argued that, even in a pre-property state, self-ownership is insufficient to protect freedom. Therefore, libertarians who believe in self-ownership should either offer a defense of freedom that is independent from their defense of self-ownership, make it explicit that they hold freedom as second to self-ownership (and defend that position), or reconsider the moral basis of their political views.