{"title":"在联合国制裁下对朝鲜船只进行海上拦截","authors":"James Kraska","doi":"10.15779/Z38M61BQ4M","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To be effective in shaping state conduct, the liberalism and idealism that informs public international law must contend with geopolitical realities and the role of power in the international system. David D. Caron was unafraid to address this dichotomy. His work bridged epistemic communities and offered concrete approaches to some of the most vexing international problems. Caron’s work on radioactive waste and nuclear weapons at sea, for example, manifests a profound understanding of the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit nuclear materials in the oceans, and how international law reduces these ghastly perils. By providing boundaries for state behavior and fashioning a stability of expectations, international law deepens military and environmental security, and thereby reduces geopolitical risks. Inspired by the contributions of Caron and Harry Scheiber in exploring international law as a tool for addressing the threat of nuclear weapons and material at sea, this Article demonstrates how the legal process is the best tool available, albeit an imperfect one, to counter North Korea’s maritime proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. \n \nThe nuclear weapons program of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) emerged within a complex regional political reality. Protected by U.S. extended deterrence, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has prospered for nearly seventy years despite lying directly under the guns of North Korea, which is enabled by China and Russia to serve as a cudgel to oppose American presence in the region. The DPRK detonated its first nuclear device in 1993, challenging the U.S. nuclear security umbrella and opening the specter of nuclear proliferation. If the United States and ROK actively punish North Korea with military force, North Korea likely would lash out in all directions. If they relent and accept the DPRK into the nuclear club, the consequences could prove equally deadly. International law lies within this dilemma as the only credible option for containing the rogue state’s nuclear ambitions. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) operate in tandem for this purpose. The Charter may be considered a constitution for the world; UNCLOS has been called the constitution for the oceans. \n \nThese seminal treaties work together in a powerful way to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program. Specifically, the UN Security Council has invoked its authority in Chapter VII of the Charter to address threats to the peace by harnessing the legal competence of flag state, port state, and coastal state authority reflected in UNCLOS to strangle North Korea’s access to oceanic trade, crippling its economy and undermining its ability to spread nuclear material and weapons. The struggle to develop and enforce international rules to stop North Korea’s nuclear program is a story still unfolding. But decades of progress in international law and state practice have combined with tighter sanctions by the Security Council to dramatically cripple North Korea’s ability to develop and share nuclear weapons and supporting material and technology. The consequences of failure are genuinely terrifying, as even a single nuclear detonation anywhere in the world would prove catastrophic to global economic and political stability.","PeriodicalId":325917,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of International Law","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Maritime Interdiction of North Korean Ships under UN Sanctions\",\"authors\":\"James Kraska\",\"doi\":\"10.15779/Z38M61BQ4M\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"To be effective in shaping state conduct, the liberalism and idealism that informs public international law must contend with geopolitical realities and the role of power in the international system. David D. Caron was unafraid to address this dichotomy. His work bridged epistemic communities and offered concrete approaches to some of the most vexing international problems. Caron’s work on radioactive waste and nuclear weapons at sea, for example, manifests a profound understanding of the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit nuclear materials in the oceans, and how international law reduces these ghastly perils. By providing boundaries for state behavior and fashioning a stability of expectations, international law deepens military and environmental security, and thereby reduces geopolitical risks. Inspired by the contributions of Caron and Harry Scheiber in exploring international law as a tool for addressing the threat of nuclear weapons and material at sea, this Article demonstrates how the legal process is the best tool available, albeit an imperfect one, to counter North Korea’s maritime proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. \\n \\nThe nuclear weapons program of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) emerged within a complex regional political reality. Protected by U.S. extended deterrence, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has prospered for nearly seventy years despite lying directly under the guns of North Korea, which is enabled by China and Russia to serve as a cudgel to oppose American presence in the region. The DPRK detonated its first nuclear device in 1993, challenging the U.S. nuclear security umbrella and opening the specter of nuclear proliferation. If the United States and ROK actively punish North Korea with military force, North Korea likely would lash out in all directions. If they relent and accept the DPRK into the nuclear club, the consequences could prove equally deadly. International law lies within this dilemma as the only credible option for containing the rogue state’s nuclear ambitions. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) operate in tandem for this purpose. The Charter may be considered a constitution for the world; UNCLOS has been called the constitution for the oceans. \\n \\nThese seminal treaties work together in a powerful way to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
为了有效地塑造国家行为,国际公法中的自由主义和理想主义必须与地缘政治现实以及权力在国际体系中的作用相抗衡。大卫·d·卡隆(David D. Caron)毫不畏惧地提出了这种二分法。他的工作弥合了认知社区,并为一些最棘手的国际问题提供了具体的方法。例如,卡隆对海上放射性废物和核武器的研究表明,他深刻理解核武器和非法核材料在海洋中的扩散所构成的威胁,以及国际法如何减少这些可怕的危险。通过为国家行为提供边界,形成稳定的预期,国际法深化了军事和环境安全,从而降低了地缘政治风险。受Caron和Harry Scheiber在探索国际法作为解决海上核武器和材料威胁的工具方面的贡献的启发,本文展示了法律程序如何成为应对朝鲜核武器和技术海上扩散的最佳工具,尽管它并不完美。朝鲜人民民主主义共和国(DPRK)的核武器计划是在复杂的地区政治现实中出现的。在美国延伸威慑的保护下,大韩民国在朝鲜的枪口下繁荣了近70年,而中国和俄罗斯使朝鲜成为反对美国在该地区存在的棍棒。1993年,朝鲜首次引爆核装置,挑战了美国的核安全保护伞,开启了核扩散的阴霾。如果美国和韩国积极用武力惩罚朝鲜,朝鲜很可能会全方位出击。如果他们心软,接受朝鲜加入核俱乐部,后果可能同样致命。国际法是遏制这个流氓国家核野心的唯一可靠选择,就在这个两难境地之中。为此,《联合国宪章》和《联合国海洋法公约》相辅相成。《宪章》可被视为世界宪法;《联合国海洋法公约》被称为海洋宪法。这些具有开创性的条约以强有力的方式共同限制朝鲜的核计划。具体而言,联合国安理会援引《联合国宪章》第七章赋予的权力,利用《联合国海洋法公约》规定的船旗国、港口国和沿海国的法律权限,遏制朝鲜进入海洋贸易的途径,削弱其经济,削弱其扩散核材料和武器的能力,以应对对和平的威胁。制定和执行国际规则以阻止朝鲜核计划的斗争仍在展开。但是,几十年来国际法和国家实践的进步,加上安理会更严厉的制裁,极大地削弱了朝鲜开发和分享核武器以及支持材料和技术的能力。失败的后果真的很可怕,因为即使在世界任何地方发生一次核爆炸,也会对全球经济和政治稳定造成灾难性影响。
Maritime Interdiction of North Korean Ships under UN Sanctions
To be effective in shaping state conduct, the liberalism and idealism that informs public international law must contend with geopolitical realities and the role of power in the international system. David D. Caron was unafraid to address this dichotomy. His work bridged epistemic communities and offered concrete approaches to some of the most vexing international problems. Caron’s work on radioactive waste and nuclear weapons at sea, for example, manifests a profound understanding of the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit nuclear materials in the oceans, and how international law reduces these ghastly perils. By providing boundaries for state behavior and fashioning a stability of expectations, international law deepens military and environmental security, and thereby reduces geopolitical risks. Inspired by the contributions of Caron and Harry Scheiber in exploring international law as a tool for addressing the threat of nuclear weapons and material at sea, this Article demonstrates how the legal process is the best tool available, albeit an imperfect one, to counter North Korea’s maritime proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.
The nuclear weapons program of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) emerged within a complex regional political reality. Protected by U.S. extended deterrence, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has prospered for nearly seventy years despite lying directly under the guns of North Korea, which is enabled by China and Russia to serve as a cudgel to oppose American presence in the region. The DPRK detonated its first nuclear device in 1993, challenging the U.S. nuclear security umbrella and opening the specter of nuclear proliferation. If the United States and ROK actively punish North Korea with military force, North Korea likely would lash out in all directions. If they relent and accept the DPRK into the nuclear club, the consequences could prove equally deadly. International law lies within this dilemma as the only credible option for containing the rogue state’s nuclear ambitions. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) operate in tandem for this purpose. The Charter may be considered a constitution for the world; UNCLOS has been called the constitution for the oceans.
These seminal treaties work together in a powerful way to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program. Specifically, the UN Security Council has invoked its authority in Chapter VII of the Charter to address threats to the peace by harnessing the legal competence of flag state, port state, and coastal state authority reflected in UNCLOS to strangle North Korea’s access to oceanic trade, crippling its economy and undermining its ability to spread nuclear material and weapons. The struggle to develop and enforce international rules to stop North Korea’s nuclear program is a story still unfolding. But decades of progress in international law and state practice have combined with tighter sanctions by the Security Council to dramatically cripple North Korea’s ability to develop and share nuclear weapons and supporting material and technology. The consequences of failure are genuinely terrifying, as even a single nuclear detonation anywhere in the world would prove catastrophic to global economic and political stability.