怀疑者眼中的斯多葛伦理学

A. Sanzhenakov
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摘要

本文评价了对斯多葛派伦理学的怀疑批评。这篇文章的作者指出了怀疑论者论证中的一些弱点。因此,怀疑论者质疑,怀疑论者认为,斯多葛学派错误地识别了善本身。作为证据,怀疑论者指出了教条主义者在这个问题上的分歧。这篇文章的作者认为,这样的论点不是决定性的,不能诋毁斯多葛派的立场。怀疑论者可以通过提出一种验证善本身的程序来加强他们的批评,但在这种情况下,他们自己就会变成教条主义者。另一条怀疑论批评的路线与最高善的论点有关,最高善作为这样一个选择的对象,应该为其自身的利益而选择。怀疑论者认为,如果这样一个选择的对象存在,那么它本身就包含了一个矛盾。既然我们选择善是为了善本身,既然我们对事物不感兴趣,而是对选择本身感兴趣,那么我们就必须回避善,因为在接受善之后,我们就失去了选择它的机会。这种矛盾被亚里士多德的唯能概念所根除,这个概念被斯多葛学派以自己的方式继承和发展。斯多葛学派和怀疑论者之间的矛盾最明显地体现在他们对行动理论的讨论中,由此可以得出结论,这两个学派之间的分歧不仅存在于理论层面,而且存在于世界观层面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
STOIC ETHICS THROUGH THE EYES OF SKEPTICS
The article evaluates the skeptical criticism of Stoic ethics. The author of the article notes some weak points of the Skeptics’ argumentation. Thus, skeptics have questioned that the Thus, Skeptics argued that the Stoics misidentified the good in itself. As evidence, Skeptics pointed to disagreement among dogmatists on this issue. The author of the article argues that such an argument is not decisive and cannot discredit the position of the Stoics. Skeptics could strengthen their criticism by proposing a procedure for verifying the good in itself, but in that case, they themselves would become dogmatists. Another line of skeptical criticism is connected with the thesis about the highest good, as such an object of choice, which should be chosen for its own sake. Skeptics argue that if such an object of choice exists, then it contains a contradiction in itself. Since we choose the good for its own sake, insofar as we are not interested in the subject, but in the choice itself, therefore, we must avoid the good, because after receiving it we will be deprived of the opportunity to choose it. This contradiction is eradicated by the Aristotelian concept of energeia, which was inherited and developed by the Stoics in its own way. The contradiction between the Stoics and Skeptics is most clearly manifested in their discussion of the theory of action, from which it can be concluded that disagreements between these schools exist not only at the theoretical, but also at the worldview level.
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