高度两极分化和事实替代时代的司法审查

David A. Dana, M. Barsa
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引用次数: 0

摘要

高度两极化和倾向于只在政治光谱的一端接受“替代事实”,对行政机构的司法审查有影响。恭恭敬敬的司法审查的一个主要理由是,机构是技术专家。法院作为非专家,遵从机构的意见,部分原因是它们信任机构的技术分析和判断的完整性。但在一个高度两极分化的时代——至少是部分拒绝科学方法而支持替代事实的时代——基于机构技术能力的顺从就不那么合理了。相反,法院不能轻易假定机构的技术、专家、“事实”分析和结论得到充分支持。当一个机构在选举后改变立场,拒绝上届政府的政策,并采取截然不同的政策时,基于技术官僚专长的尊重尤其值得怀疑。这种政策波动通常发生在党派高度分化的焦点问题上——正是在这些焦点问题上,技术官僚能力的假设最站不住脚。基于这种对超极化影响的洞察,我们主张重新评估法院如何审查行政机构的政策变化。虽然一些先例表明,当机构偏离过去的做法或方法时,它们会面临特别“严厉的审视”,但美国最高法院在联邦通信委员会诉福克斯电视台一案中的裁决通常被解读为,当一个机构改变路线时,与当它保持路线或首次解决问题时,建立了相同程度的顺从审查。而且,作为一个规范问题,学者们主张对机构转移进行恭恭敬敬的审查,以避免机构“僵化”和官僚惰性——以落实刚刚赢得权力的政党的价值观,因为在民主制度下,选举必须重要。尽管如此,我们认为福克斯案不需要——也不应该——被解读为阻止法院采用我们这个高度两极分化的时代所证明的那种司法审查。福克斯特别支持法院要求各机构以高标准解释为什么上届政府所依赖的事实不再真实或相关,或者不再严重支持上届政府得出的结论。值得注意的是,在福克斯案中,法院既不能就支持其最近政策变化的新事实对机构提出严肃的质疑,也不能就这些新声称的事实的依据提出质疑。对福克斯案的广泛而公正的解读也支持法院要求行政机关有意义地解释他们的转变将如何影响广泛理解的依赖利益,以及如果他们有意义地考虑这些依赖利益,行政机关是如何寻求的。我们在这里的目标之一是反驳特朗普的环境保护局最近提出的说法,即现行判例法允许一个机构几乎无限制地自由裁量权,以放弃前总统政府期间采用的规则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Judicial Review in an Age of Hyper-Polarization and Alternative Facts
Hyper-polarization and tendency to embrace “alternative facts” on just one end of the political spectrum has implications for judicial review of administrative agencies. A principal rationale for deferential judicial review is that agencies are technocratic experts. Courts, as non-experts, defer to agencies in part because they trust the integrity of agencies’ technical analyses and judgment. But in an age of hyper-polarization – and at minimum a partial rejection of the scientific method in favor of alternative facts – deference based on agencies’ technical competence is less justified. Instead, courts cannot as readily assume that agencies’ technical, expert, “factual” analyses and conclusions are well-supported. Deference based on technocratic expertise is particularly questionable when an agency shifts its position after an election by rejecting the previous administration’s policy and adopting a dramatically different one. Such policy swings typically occur around focal points of partisan hyper-polarization – it is with respect to such focal point issues that the assumption of technocratic competence is least tenable. Building on this insight about the effects of hyper-polarization, we argue for a re-assessment of how courts review administrative agency changes in policy. While some precedent suggests that agencies face an especially “hard look” when they deviate from past practices or approaches, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. is generally read as establishing the same level of deferential review when an agency shifts course as when it stays the course or addresses an issue for the very first time. And, as a normative matter, scholars have argued for deferential review regarding agency shifts so as to avoid agency “ossification” and bureaucratic inertia – to give effect to the values of the party that just won power because, in a democracy, elections must matter. Nonetheless, we believe that Fox need not – and should not – be read to preclude courts from adopting the kind of judicial review our age of hyper-polarization justifies. In particular, Fox supports courts holding agencies to a high standard in explaining why the facts that a previous administration relied upon are no longer true or relevant or no longer weigh heavily in favor of conclusions reached by the previous administration. Notably, nothing in Fox prevents courts from either seriously questioning an agency about what new facts support its recent policy change, or from interrogating the basis for those newly claimed facts. A broad but fair reading of Fox also supports courts calling on agencies to meaningfully explain how their shifts will affect reliance interests, broadly understood, and how the agencies sought, if they did, to meaningfully take account of those reliance interests. One of our goals here is to rebut the claim recently made by Trump’s EPA that current case law allows an agency almost unlimited discretion to discard the rules adopted during a previous Presidential Administration.
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