Giovanni Cardillo, Franco Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci
{"title":"银行救助的溢出效应","authors":"Giovanni Cardillo, Franco Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912465","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Do public supports to banks generate spillover effects and influence the financial stability during banking crises? By using a hand-collected dataset in Europe from 2007 to 2017, we adopt a dynamic difference-in-differences approach and show a spillover effect when the bailout is not associated with conditions: when rescued banks receive a bailout without any restricting condition, their competitors have incentives to worsen the quality of their loan portfolios by leading a reduction in their competitors’ margins. We also run an event study and show that these policies attract negative abnormal returns from investors.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Spillover Effects of Bank Bailouts\",\"authors\":\"Giovanni Cardillo, Franco Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3912465\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Do public supports to banks generate spillover effects and influence the financial stability during banking crises? By using a hand-collected dataset in Europe from 2007 to 2017, we adopt a dynamic difference-in-differences approach and show a spillover effect when the bailout is not associated with conditions: when rescued banks receive a bailout without any restricting condition, their competitors have incentives to worsen the quality of their loan portfolios by leading a reduction in their competitors’ margins. We also run an event study and show that these policies attract negative abnormal returns from investors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":331807,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Banking & Insurance eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Banking & Insurance eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912465\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912465","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do public supports to banks generate spillover effects and influence the financial stability during banking crises? By using a hand-collected dataset in Europe from 2007 to 2017, we adopt a dynamic difference-in-differences approach and show a spillover effect when the bailout is not associated with conditions: when rescued banks receive a bailout without any restricting condition, their competitors have incentives to worsen the quality of their loan portfolios by leading a reduction in their competitors’ margins. We also run an event study and show that these policies attract negative abnormal returns from investors.