{"title":"金融中介是总体不稳定的来源","authors":"Fabrizio Mattesini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.450081","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider a simple overlapping generations economy where the behavior of intermediaries, in a market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard, may give rise to cyclical equilibria. When capital increases output and savings also increase and therefore more capital will be available in the following period. At the same time, however, the higher supply of of savings leads to a decrease in the deposit interest rate and this will induce intermediaries to decrease the number of firms that are monitored. A larger number of firms will select low quality projects and, because of this, less capital will be produced in the following period. For some parameter values this second effect may prevail over the first one and the stock of capital in period t+1 may actually be lower than the stock of capital in period t. The model provides a rigorous interpretation of the view associated with Hyman Minsky [18], Charles Kindleberger [16], and Henry Kaufman [15], according to which expansions come to an inevitable end because of excessive or ill-considered lending that took place during the boom.","PeriodicalId":416571,"journal":{"name":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2003-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Financial Intermediation as a Source of Aggregate Instability\",\"authors\":\"Fabrizio Mattesini\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.450081\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider a simple overlapping generations economy where the behavior of intermediaries, in a market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard, may give rise to cyclical equilibria. When capital increases output and savings also increase and therefore more capital will be available in the following period. At the same time, however, the higher supply of of savings leads to a decrease in the deposit interest rate and this will induce intermediaries to decrease the number of firms that are monitored. A larger number of firms will select low quality projects and, because of this, less capital will be produced in the following period. For some parameter values this second effect may prevail over the first one and the stock of capital in period t+1 may actually be lower than the stock of capital in period t. The model provides a rigorous interpretation of the view associated with Hyman Minsky [18], Charles Kindleberger [16], and Henry Kaufman [15], according to which expansions come to an inevitable end because of excessive or ill-considered lending that took place during the boom.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416571,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2003-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.450081\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CEIS: Centre for Economic & International Studies Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.450081","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
我们考虑一个简单的重叠代经济,在一个以信息不对称和道德风险为特征的市场中,中介的行为可能会产生周期性均衡。当资本增加时,产出和储蓄也会增加,因此在接下来的时期会有更多的资本可用。然而,与此同时,较高的储蓄供应导致存款利率下降,这将诱使中介机构减少被监测的公司数量。更多的公司将选择低质量的项目,因此,在接下来的一段时间内产生的资本将会减少。对于某些参数值,第二种效应可能优于第一种效应,并且时期t+1的资本存量实际上可能低于时期t的资本存量。该模型提供了与Hyman Minsky [18], Charles Kindleberger[16]和Henry Kaufman[15]相关的观点的严格解释,根据该观点,由于在繁荣时期发生的过度或欠考虑的贷款,扩张将不可避免地结束。
Financial Intermediation as a Source of Aggregate Instability
We consider a simple overlapping generations economy where the behavior of intermediaries, in a market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard, may give rise to cyclical equilibria. When capital increases output and savings also increase and therefore more capital will be available in the following period. At the same time, however, the higher supply of of savings leads to a decrease in the deposit interest rate and this will induce intermediaries to decrease the number of firms that are monitored. A larger number of firms will select low quality projects and, because of this, less capital will be produced in the following period. For some parameter values this second effect may prevail over the first one and the stock of capital in period t+1 may actually be lower than the stock of capital in period t. The model provides a rigorous interpretation of the view associated with Hyman Minsky [18], Charles Kindleberger [16], and Henry Kaufman [15], according to which expansions come to an inevitable end because of excessive or ill-considered lending that took place during the boom.