知识转移与创新联盟稳定性

Zhang Jiang
{"title":"知识转移与创新联盟稳定性","authors":"Zhang Jiang","doi":"10.1109/KAM.2010.5646159","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A dynamic game model of two stages under incomplete information from the view of knowledge transfer is developed to research effects of ownership allocation and knowledge learning ability on the dynamic cooperative stability of the innovation alliance. The results show if one partner succeeds in learning knowledge while the other partner fails to do so, the former requires a higher ownership level to maintain the alliance, which may provide some theoretical supports for selections of the optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship.","PeriodicalId":160788,"journal":{"name":"2010 Third International Symposium on Knowledge Acquisition and Modeling","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Knowledge transfer and innovation alliance stability\",\"authors\":\"Zhang Jiang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/KAM.2010.5646159\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A dynamic game model of two stages under incomplete information from the view of knowledge transfer is developed to research effects of ownership allocation and knowledge learning ability on the dynamic cooperative stability of the innovation alliance. The results show if one partner succeeds in learning knowledge while the other partner fails to do so, the former requires a higher ownership level to maintain the alliance, which may provide some theoretical supports for selections of the optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship.\",\"PeriodicalId\":160788,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2010 Third International Symposium on Knowledge Acquisition and Modeling\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-11-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2010 Third International Symposium on Knowledge Acquisition and Modeling\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/KAM.2010.5646159\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 Third International Symposium on Knowledge Acquisition and Modeling","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/KAM.2010.5646159","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

从知识转移视角出发,建立了不完全信息条件下的两阶段动态博弈模型,研究了所有权配置和知识学习能力对创新联盟动态合作稳定性的影响。结果表明,当一方成功学习知识而另一方学习失败时,前者需要更高的所有权水平来维持联盟,这可能为最优动态竞争合作关系的选择提供理论支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knowledge transfer and innovation alliance stability
A dynamic game model of two stages under incomplete information from the view of knowledge transfer is developed to research effects of ownership allocation and knowledge learning ability on the dynamic cooperative stability of the innovation alliance. The results show if one partner succeeds in learning knowledge while the other partner fails to do so, the former requires a higher ownership level to maintain the alliance, which may provide some theoretical supports for selections of the optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信