人权思想与战争法

D. Luban
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引用次数: 9

摘要

在一个重要的早期案例中,前南问题国际法庭评论说:“整个国际人道主义法和人权法的实质在于保护每个人的人的尊严……尊重人的尊严的一般原则是……这就是国际人道主义法和人权法存在的理由。”国际人道主义法和国际人权法是否具有相同的“本质”,而这一本质就是尊重人的尊严的一般原则?用查尔斯·贝茨的话来说,人道主义法“也许更应该称为‘武装冲突中的人权法’”,这是真的吗?我认为,如果回答是肯定的,就等于对国际人道法进行了重新解释,偏离了其历史。这种重新解释就是我所说的人权思想(以区别于教义细节)。最初,国际人道法的目的不是保护人的尊严,而是减少人的痛苦;这是救灾的一种形式。相比之下,人权法最初是作为和平时期社会的蓝图而制定的,这种社会将不再使世界陷入《联合国宪章》(UN Charter)所称的战争“无尽的悲哀”。然而,法律是会变的。也许随着时间的推移,国际人道法的性质已经朝着人权思想的方向发展,而且应该朝着这个方向发展。这就是我在本文的最后几节中所捍卫的观点——附带一些条件。首先,我探讨了国际人道法和人权法的不同谱系,并解释了人权思想是如何融入国际人道法的。我把这种迁移归因于国际刑法、军事占领和对美国反恐战争的反应。在最后几节中,我探讨了在战争中追求人权思想的两种方式。我认为,其中之一是过分夸大和高估了人权思想所能取得的成就。它这样做,实际上,愿意消除战争与和平之间的根本区别。另一种是我为之辩护了30多年的方法。从本质上讲,它包括以平民的视角看待战争的灾难,并据此解读法律——有人可能会说,承认勇气母亲和她的孩子们对战争法的重要性,就像亨利五世和他的兄弟们一样。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War
In a significant early case, the ICTY commented: “The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person… The general principle of respect for human dignity is... the very raison d'etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law.”Is it true that international humanitarian law and international human rights law share the same “essence,” and that essence is the general principle of respect for human dignity? Is it true that, in the words of Charles Beitz, humanitarian law is “perhaps better described as the law of ‘human rights in armed conflicts’”? To answer yes, I argue, amounts to a reinterpretation of IHL that drifts far from its history. This reinterpretation is what I label human rights thinking (to distinguish it from doctrinal specifics). In its origins, IHL was not designed to protect human dignity, but to reduce human suffering; it was a form of disaster relief. Human rights law, by contrast, originated as a blueprint for the kind of peacetime societies that would no longer plunge the world into what the UN Charter calls the “untold sorrow” of war.Nevertheless, law changes. Perhaps the nature of IHL has evolved over time in the direction of human rights thinking, and should evolve that way. That is the view I defend – with some qualifications – in the final sections of this essay. First, I explore the very different genealogies of IHL and human rights law, and explain how human rights thinking migrated into IHL. I attribute the migration to international criminal law, military occupations, and reactions to the U.S. war on terrorism. In the final sections, I explore two ways human rights thinking can be pursued in wars. One of them, I will argue, overplays and overestimates what human rights thinking can accomplish. It does so by, in effect, willing away fundamental differences between war and peace. The other is an approach that I have defended for more than three decades. It consists, at bottom, of taking a civilian’s-eye view of the disasters of war and reading the law accordingly – recognizing, one might say, that Mother Courage and her children matter just as much to the law of war as Henry V and his band of brothers.
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