I. Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, A. Saberi, C. Sholley
{"title":"边缘加权在线窗口匹配","authors":"I. Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, A. Saberi, C. Sholley","doi":"10.1145/3328526.3329573","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by applications from ride-sharing and kidney exchange, we study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and the planner's goal is to maximize the total value over a finite time horizon. First we study the case in which vertices arrive in an adversarial order. We provide a randomized 1/4-competitive algorithm building on a result by Feldman et al. [14] and Lehmann et al. [23]. We extend the model to the case in which departure times are drawn independently from a distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate, for which we establish a 1/8-competitive algorithm. When the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random, we show that a batching algorithm, which computes a maximum-weighted matching every (d+1) periods, is $0.279$-competitive.","PeriodicalId":416173,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"59","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching\",\"authors\":\"I. Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, A. Saberi, C. Sholley\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3328526.3329573\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Motivated by applications from ride-sharing and kidney exchange, we study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and the planner's goal is to maximize the total value over a finite time horizon. First we study the case in which vertices arrive in an adversarial order. We provide a randomized 1/4-competitive algorithm building on a result by Feldman et al. [14] and Lehmann et al. [23]. We extend the model to the case in which departure times are drawn independently from a distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate, for which we establish a 1/8-competitive algorithm. When the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random, we show that a batching algorithm, which computes a maximum-weighted matching every (d+1) periods, is $0.279$-competitive.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416173,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":\"120 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"59\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329573\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329573","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Motivated by applications from ride-sharing and kidney exchange, we study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and the planner's goal is to maximize the total value over a finite time horizon. First we study the case in which vertices arrive in an adversarial order. We provide a randomized 1/4-competitive algorithm building on a result by Feldman et al. [14] and Lehmann et al. [23]. We extend the model to the case in which departure times are drawn independently from a distribution with non-decreasing hazard rate, for which we establish a 1/8-competitive algorithm. When the arrival order is chosen uniformly at random, we show that a batching algorithm, which computes a maximum-weighted matching every (d+1) periods, is $0.279$-competitive.