碳补偿条款与内疚的消费者

J. Gans, Vivienne Groves
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引用次数: 1

摘要

碳补偿可以让消费者减轻他们对电力排放的负罪感。一方面,当在与电力无关的行业中购买抵消时,抵消是对消费的补充,并且引入抵消市场导致电力消费上升。另一方面,当在相关行业购买补偿时,即为了满足消费者对绿色电力的需求,脏电的消耗和补偿是替代的,脏电消耗下降。然而,总的来说,净排放量下降。我们发现这条规则有三个例外。当在一个不相关的市场上购买碳补偿时,消费者对碳补偿从大气中吸收碳的有效性过于自信,可能导致净排放量上升。同样,如果在没有碳补偿的情况下没有潜在的需求,那么当“肮脏的”生产商拥有市场力量时,碳补偿的引入可能会导致净排放量的增加。如果“肮脏的”生产商能够参与先发制人的战略承诺,并且抵消价格是内生的,那么购买补偿以资助绿色能源排放就会上升。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Carbon Offset Provision with Guilt-Ridden Consumers
Carbon offsets allow consumers to mitigate their guilt associated with their electricity emissions. On the one hand, when offsets are purchased in an industry unrelated to electricity, offsets are complements to consumption and the introduction of an offset market causes consumption of electricity to rise. On the other hand, when offsets are purchased in a related industry – namely, to satisfy consumer demand for green electricity – consumption of dirty electricity and offsets are substitutes and dirty electricity consumption falls. In general, however, net emissions decline. We find three exceptions to this rule. When offsets are purchased in an unrelated market, too much consumer confidence in the effectiveness of offsets to sequester carbon from the atmosphere can lead to a rise in net emissions. Similarly, if there is no latent demand for offsets in their absence, the introduction of offsets can potentially cause a rise in net emissions when ‘dirty’ producers have market power. When offsets are purchased to fund green energy emissions can rise if ‘dirty’ producers can engage in pre-emptive strategic commitments and the price of offsets is chosen endogenously.
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