关于具有相对绩效补偿的委托博弈中价格均衡的(不)存在性

ERN: Other Microeconomics: Information Pub Date : 2012-01-16 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1988115

M. Kopel, L. Lambertini

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引用次数: 3

摘要

我们证明Miller和Pazgal。S(2001)的战略委托模型中，管理层的激励是基于相对绩效的，它受到一个不存在问题的影响，这个问题会影响价格均衡。造成这一结果的削价动机确实与影响价格卡特尔稳定性的动机相似。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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On the (Non) Existence of a Price Equilibrium in Delegation Games with Relative Performance Compensation

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.

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ERN: Other Microeconomics: Information

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