{"title":"强制性证券监管的成本和收益:来自2012年JOBS法案的市场反应的证据","authors":"Dhammika Dharmapala, Vikramaditya S. Khanna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2293167","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The effect of mandatory securities regulation on firm value has been a longstanding concern across law, economics and finance. In 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act, relaxing disclosure and compliance obligations for a new category of firms known as “emerging growth companies” (EGCs) that satisfied certain criteria (such as having less than $1 billion of annual revenue). The JOBS Act’s definition of an EGC involved a limited degree of retroactivity, extending its application to firms that conducted initial public offerings (IPOs) between December 8, 2011 and April 5, 2012 (the day the bill became law). The December 8 cutoff date was publicly known prior to the JOBS bill’s key legislative events, notably those of March 15, 2012, when Senate consideration began and the Senate Majority Leader expressed strong support for the bill. We analyze market reactions for EGCs that conducted IPOs after the cutoff date, relative to a control group of otherwise similar firms that conducted IPOs in the months preceding the cutoff date. We find positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for EGCs around March 15, relative to the control firms. This suggests that the value to investors of the disclosure and compliance obligations relaxed under the JOBS Act is outweighed by the associated compliance costs. The baseline results imply a positive abnormal return of between 3% and 4%, and the implied increase in firm value is at least $20 million for an EGC with the median market value in our sample.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"55","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012\",\"authors\":\"Dhammika Dharmapala, Vikramaditya S. Khanna\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2293167\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The effect of mandatory securities regulation on firm value has been a longstanding concern across law, economics and finance. In 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act, relaxing disclosure and compliance obligations for a new category of firms known as “emerging growth companies” (EGCs) that satisfied certain criteria (such as having less than $1 billion of annual revenue). The JOBS Act’s definition of an EGC involved a limited degree of retroactivity, extending its application to firms that conducted initial public offerings (IPOs) between December 8, 2011 and April 5, 2012 (the day the bill became law). The December 8 cutoff date was publicly known prior to the JOBS bill’s key legislative events, notably those of March 15, 2012, when Senate consideration began and the Senate Majority Leader expressed strong support for the bill. We analyze market reactions for EGCs that conducted IPOs after the cutoff date, relative to a control group of otherwise similar firms that conducted IPOs in the months preceding the cutoff date. We find positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for EGCs around March 15, relative to the control firms. This suggests that the value to investors of the disclosure and compliance obligations relaxed under the JOBS Act is outweighed by the associated compliance costs. The baseline results imply a positive abnormal return of between 3% and 4%, and the implied increase in firm value is at least $20 million for an EGC with the median market value in our sample.\",\"PeriodicalId\":280037,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal\",\"volume\":\"96 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-05-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"55\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293167\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293167","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 55
摘要
强制性证券监管对公司价值的影响一直是法律、经济和金融领域长期关注的问题。2012年,国会颁布了《启动创业公司法案》(Jumpstart Our Business Startups,简称“JOBS”),放宽了满足特定标准(如年收入低于10亿美元)的新兴成长型公司(EGCs)的披露和合规义务。JOBS法案对EGC的定义有一定程度的追溯力,将其适用范围扩大到2011年12月8日至2012年4月5日(该法案成为法律之日)之间进行首次公开募股(ipo)的公司。12月8日的截止日期早于JOBS法案的关键立法事件,特别是2012年3月15日,参议院开始审议,参议院多数党领袖表达了对该法案的强烈支持。我们分析了在截止日期之后进行ipo的EGCs的市场反应,以及在截止日期之前几个月进行ipo的其他类似公司的对照组。我们发现3月15日左右,相对于控制公司,EGCs的异常回报为正且具有统计学意义。这表明,《就业法案》放宽的披露和合规义务对投资者的价值被相关的合规成本所抵消。基线结果意味着3%至4%之间的正异常回报,并且对于我们样本中市值中位数的EGC,公司价值的隐含增长至少为2000万美元。
The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012
The effect of mandatory securities regulation on firm value has been a longstanding concern across law, economics and finance. In 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act, relaxing disclosure and compliance obligations for a new category of firms known as “emerging growth companies” (EGCs) that satisfied certain criteria (such as having less than $1 billion of annual revenue). The JOBS Act’s definition of an EGC involved a limited degree of retroactivity, extending its application to firms that conducted initial public offerings (IPOs) between December 8, 2011 and April 5, 2012 (the day the bill became law). The December 8 cutoff date was publicly known prior to the JOBS bill’s key legislative events, notably those of March 15, 2012, when Senate consideration began and the Senate Majority Leader expressed strong support for the bill. We analyze market reactions for EGCs that conducted IPOs after the cutoff date, relative to a control group of otherwise similar firms that conducted IPOs in the months preceding the cutoff date. We find positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for EGCs around March 15, relative to the control firms. This suggests that the value to investors of the disclosure and compliance obligations relaxed under the JOBS Act is outweighed by the associated compliance costs. The baseline results imply a positive abnormal return of between 3% and 4%, and the implied increase in firm value is at least $20 million for an EGC with the median market value in our sample.