基于贝叶斯平均场博弈的智能电网供需分析

M. Kamgarpour, H. Tembine
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引用次数: 18

摘要

本文探讨了能源市场中多种能源生产者竞争的博弈理论框架。每个生产者,被称为玩家,在给定需求效用的情况下优化自己的目标函数。每个参与者的均衡策略取决于其他参与者的生产成本(即类型)。我们表明,随着参与者数量的增加,这些类型的平均值足以找到均衡。对于有限数量的参与者,我们设计了一种收敛于均衡的平均场分布式学习算法。我们讨论了模型的扩展,以包括能源市场的几个现实方面。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Bayesian mean field game approach to supply demand analysis of the smart grid
We explore a game theoretic framework for multiple energy producers competing in energy market. Each producer, referred to as a player, optimizes its own objective function given the demand utility. The equilibrium strategy of each player depends on the production cost, referred to as type, of the other players. We show that as the number of players increases, the mean of the types is sufficient for finding the equilibrium. For finite number of players, we design a mean field distributed learning algorithm that converges to equilibrium. We discuss extensions of our model to include several realistic aspects of the energy market.
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