减少对认证增强openICE的网络层安全攻击

Zhangtan Li, Liang Cheng, Yang Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

集成临床环境(ICE)是实现医疗设备互操作性的标准化框架。它利用高级监管和医疗应用程序和低级通信中间件来协调医疗设备,以完成共享的临床任务。尽管医疗设备的互操作性有可能显著提高医疗效率并减少医疗差错,但ICE系统也面临着前所未有的安全威胁。在本文中,我们提出了一组针对ICE系统网络级别的安全攻击,即拦截、篡改和重放攻击,我们通过对ICE系统最著名的实例OpenICE进行威胁建模分析来识别这些攻击。针对这些安全攻击,我们在OpenICE之上设计了相应的防御机制。我们的实验表明,这些防御机制可以有效地保护OpenICE免受已识别的攻击,并且计算开销可以接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mitigating network-layer security attacks on authentication-enhanced openICE
Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) is a standardized framework for achieving medical device interoperability. It utilizes high-level supervisory and medical apps and low-level communication middle-ware to coordinate medical devices to accomplish a shared clinical mission. With the potential to significantly improve healthcare productivity and reduce medical errors, the interoperability of medical devices also subjects ICE systems to unprecedented security threats. In this paper, we present a set of security attacks, namely interception, tampering, and replay attack, to the network level of ICE systems, which we identify through a threat modeling analysis on OpenICE, the best-known instantiation of ICE system. For these security attacks, we devise corresponding defense mechanisms on top of OpenICE. Our experiments demonstrate that these defense mechanisms can effectively protect OpenICE from the identified attacks with acceptable computational overhead.
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