群体承诺的升级与信息框架的调节作用

Robert W. Rutledge
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引用次数: 22

摘要

负责做出项目投资初始决策的经理通常会倾向于“过度承诺”项目的额外资源(Staw, 1976,1981;斯托和福克斯,1977;Staw and Ross, 1978, 1980)。即使项目经济表现不佳,总投资也会增加。术语“承诺升级”或“升级效应”被用来描述这种投资倾向。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Moderating Effects of Information Framing
A manager who is responsible for making the initial decision to invest in a project will typically have a tendency to “over‐commit” additional resources to the project (Staw, 1976, 1981; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978, 1980). This increased total investment can occur even when the project shows poor economic performance. The terms “escalation of commitment” or “escalation effects” are used to describe such investment tendencies.
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