{"title":"大众或精英极化是威权倒退的驱动因素?来自14项波兰调查(2005-2021)的证据","authors":"İpek Çınar, M. Nalepa","doi":"10.1561/113.00000067","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Is elite or mass polarization the driver of the democratic backsliding? A number of recent papers in the political economy of backsliding have developed theoretical predictions about the effects of polarization in the electorate as well as elite polarization on the process of democratic backsliding. However, when tested, these predictions focus on the polarization of political elites, typically within the same country. Cross-national data is ill-suited for the purpose of testing these predictions as we have no common yardstick against which to measure what is a “dangerous” level of polarization or how to compare countries that use different electoral systems and, subsequently, have different party systems and democratic institutions. Yet scholars for the most part have avoided even describing the emergence of mass polarization outside of the US. We offer a longitudinal analysis of Polish public opinion data that anticipates the country’s downturn into authoritarianism by a few years to examine if polarization of the electorate preceded or followed the polarization of party elites. It focuses on a single, yet ultimately divisive issue—the costs and benefits of EU membership—five years prior to accession and five years following joining the international organization. Specifically, it makes use of annual and monthly data from CBOS Political Preferences of Poles Survey to provide evidence that polarized attitudes regarding EU membership followed, rather that preceded the polarization of parties on this issue.","PeriodicalId":273358,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mass or Elite Polarization as the Driver of Authoritarian Backsliding? Evidence from 14 Polish Surveys (2005–2021)\",\"authors\":\"İpek Çınar, M. Nalepa\",\"doi\":\"10.1561/113.00000067\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Is elite or mass polarization the driver of the democratic backsliding? A number of recent papers in the political economy of backsliding have developed theoretical predictions about the effects of polarization in the electorate as well as elite polarization on the process of democratic backsliding. However, when tested, these predictions focus on the polarization of political elites, typically within the same country. Cross-national data is ill-suited for the purpose of testing these predictions as we have no common yardstick against which to measure what is a “dangerous” level of polarization or how to compare countries that use different electoral systems and, subsequently, have different party systems and democratic institutions. Yet scholars for the most part have avoided even describing the emergence of mass polarization outside of the US. We offer a longitudinal analysis of Polish public opinion data that anticipates the country’s downturn into authoritarianism by a few years to examine if polarization of the electorate preceded or followed the polarization of party elites. It focuses on a single, yet ultimately divisive issue—the costs and benefits of EU membership—five years prior to accession and five years following joining the international organization. Specifically, it makes use of annual and monthly data from CBOS Political Preferences of Poles Survey to provide evidence that polarized attitudes regarding EU membership followed, rather that preceded the polarization of parties on this issue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":273358,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy\",\"volume\":\"114 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1561/113.00000067\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1561/113.00000067","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mass or Elite Polarization as the Driver of Authoritarian Backsliding? Evidence from 14 Polish Surveys (2005–2021)
Is elite or mass polarization the driver of the democratic backsliding? A number of recent papers in the political economy of backsliding have developed theoretical predictions about the effects of polarization in the electorate as well as elite polarization on the process of democratic backsliding. However, when tested, these predictions focus on the polarization of political elites, typically within the same country. Cross-national data is ill-suited for the purpose of testing these predictions as we have no common yardstick against which to measure what is a “dangerous” level of polarization or how to compare countries that use different electoral systems and, subsequently, have different party systems and democratic institutions. Yet scholars for the most part have avoided even describing the emergence of mass polarization outside of the US. We offer a longitudinal analysis of Polish public opinion data that anticipates the country’s downturn into authoritarianism by a few years to examine if polarization of the electorate preceded or followed the polarization of party elites. It focuses on a single, yet ultimately divisive issue—the costs and benefits of EU membership—five years prior to accession and five years following joining the international organization. Specifically, it makes use of annual and monthly data from CBOS Political Preferences of Poles Survey to provide evidence that polarized attitudes regarding EU membership followed, rather that preceded the polarization of parties on this issue.