从事件日志中检测利用MS17-010修复的漏洞的攻击

Mariko Fujimoto, Wataru Matsuda, Takuho Mitsunaga
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引用次数: 1

摘要

许多组织都经历过利用Windows漏洞的网络攻击所造成的损害。由于操作原因,未打补丁的Windows至今仍在使用,特别是在工业控制系统(ICS)中。在这种情况下,攻击者可能会滥用它们来扩大感染。特别是MS17-010修复的漏洞已被用于传播恶意软件感染,如WannaCry勒索软件和其他恶意软件进行针对性攻击。全球许多系统(如电子公告牌、支付终端、汽车生产线)都被利用Windows漏洞,导致各种关键基础设施的系统故障。网络上已经出现了“永恒之蓝”、“永恒浪漫”等方便的攻击工具,攻击者可以很容易地利用这些漏洞。该工具滥用在Windows系统上运行的合法进程。因此,操作人员可能很难注意到攻击的痕迹。利用漏洞的攻击可以通过应用安全更新来减轻;然而,由于安全更新的长期生命周期和对可用性的严格要求,有时应用安全更新很困难。有几种方法可以检测利用漏洞(如入侵检测系统(IDS))的攻击,但有时很难实现,因为它需要改变现有的系统结构。在这项研究中,我们提出了一种方法,通过分析windows的内置事件日志来检测利用MS17-010中修复的漏洞的攻击。所提出的方法可以检测几乎所有支持的Windows版本的攻击。此外,它可以很容易地集成到生产环境中,因为它只使用Windows标准功能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Detecting attacks leveraging vulnerabilities fixed in MS17-010 from Event Log
Many organizations have experienced the damages of cyberattacks leveraging Windows vulnerabilities. Unpatched Windows have been used still now, especially in Industrial Control System (ICS) for operational reasons. In that case, attackers likely abuse them to expand infection. Especially vulnerabilities fixed in MS17-010 has been leveraged for spreading infection of malware such as the WannaCry ransomware and other malware for targeted attacks. Many systems (e.g., electric noticeboard, payment terminal, car production line) around the world were exploited by leveraging Windows vulnerabilities, leading to system failures of a variety of critical infrastructure. Attackers can easily exploit the vulnerabilities since convenient tools for attacking such as ”EternalBlue” or ”Eternal Romance” are published on the Internet. This tool abuses legitimate processes running on Windows systems. Thus operators may hardly notice the trace of attacks. Attacks leveraging vulnerabilities can be mitigated by applying security updates; however, sometimes applying security updates is difficult because of its long-term life cycle and a severe requirement for availability. There are several methods for detecting attacks leveraging vulnerabilities such as the Intrusion Detection System (IDS), but sometimes it is difficult to implement since it needs to alter the existing system structure. In this research, we propose a method for detecting attacks leveraging the vulnerabilities fixed in MS17-010 by analyzing Window’s built-in Event Logs. The proposed method can detect attacks against almost all supported versions of Windows. Furthermore, it can be easily integrated into a production environment since it only uses Windows standard functions.
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