公开可验证的拍卖，泄漏最小

Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2004. COMPSAC 2004. Pub Date : 2004-09-28 DOI:10.1109/CMPSAC.2004.1342867

Wu Qianhong, Wang Changjie, Chen Xiaofeng, Wang Yu-Min

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引用次数: 1

摘要

提出了可公开验证的密封电子拍卖。该方案具有以下优点。它们不需要特别的可信方。开标后，只公开中标价，不公开其他投标金额的关系。获胜价格是可以公开验证的。我们的方案支持首价拍卖、Vickrey拍卖和(M+ 1)st价拍卖。最后，首价拍卖是非常有效的，通用(M+ 1)首价拍卖适用于对担保标准要求较高的情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Publicly verifiable auctions with minimal leakage

Publicly verifiable sealed electronic auctions are proposed. The schemes enjoy the following advantages. They require no special trusted parties. After bid opening phase, only the winning price is revealed and the relation of other bidding amounts keep unknown. The winning price is publicly verifiable. Our scheme supports the first-price auction, Vickrey auction and (M+l)st-price auction. Finally, the first-price auction is very efficient and the generic (M+l)st-price auction is applicable when a high standard of security is required.

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来源期刊

Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2004. COMPSAC 2004.

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