{"title":"访问变动时的两部分关税与垄断利润","authors":"Owen R. Phillips, R. Battalio","doi":"10.2307/3003661","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A two-part tariff exists when a fixed payment is made before any purchases are allowed. When buyers visit a monopolist more than once per period, they have the ability to substitute between visits and consumption per visit. This substitution weakens the surplus-extracting power of a two-part tariff; and in some cases it is more profitable to abandon the entry fee altogether.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"14","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Two-Part Tariffs and Monopoly Profits When Visits Are Variable\",\"authors\":\"Owen R. Phillips, R. Battalio\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/3003661\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A two-part tariff exists when a fixed payment is made before any purchases are allowed. When buyers visit a monopolist more than once per period, they have the ability to substitute between visits and consumption per visit. This substitution weakens the surplus-extracting power of a two-part tariff; and in some cases it is more profitable to abandon the entry fee altogether.\",\"PeriodicalId\":177728,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Bell Journal of Economics\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"14\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Bell Journal of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003661\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Bell Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003661","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Two-Part Tariffs and Monopoly Profits When Visits Are Variable
A two-part tariff exists when a fixed payment is made before any purchases are allowed. When buyers visit a monopolist more than once per period, they have the ability to substitute between visits and consumption per visit. This substitution weakens the surplus-extracting power of a two-part tariff; and in some cases it is more profitable to abandon the entry fee altogether.
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