基于agent的通信与信息信任博弈仿真

Tomoharu Hasegawa, Tomohiro Hayashida, I. Nishizaki, Shinya Sekizaki
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引用次数: 0

摘要

信任博弈是一种扩展形式的二人博弈。该博弈的子博弈完全均衡是一个被称为投资者的玩家不投资财富。因为,这种行为是投资者根据另一个被称为投资者的参与者的最佳反应做出的最佳反应,即“不投资”。根据Blacht和Feltovitch(2009)的实验结果,许多人类受试者选择了均衡策略。然而,那些被允许与对手进行廉价交谈或观察对手过去的活动的人有时会选择合作策略而不是策略。本文通过基于智能体的仿真实验,分析了信任博弈中沟通效应和信息效应的影响。实验结果表明,对手过去行为的信息对合作行为的影响大于沟通的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Agent-based simulation of trust games for communication and information
A trust game is a two-player game in extended form. The sub game perfect equilibrium of the game is that a player called an investor does not invest the wealth. Because, this behavior is the best response of the investor according to the best response of the another player, called an investor, "not invest". Based on the experimental results of Blacht and Feltovitch(2009), many human subjects choose the equilibrium strategies. However, who are allowed to communicate with the opponent by cheap talk or to observe past activities of the opponent sometimes choose cooperative strategies not strategies. In this study, an agent-based simulation experiments are conducted to analyze the effect of the communication and information effects in the trust games. The experimental result indicates that the effect of information of the past behavior of the opponent to the cooperative behavior is larger than the effect of communication.
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