影响作为违约救济的损害赔偿的标准

Frank Giaoui
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Sophistication of the methodology developed by the claimant in support of her claim has logically a positive impact on the win rate and the recovery rate. This is true in all three situations for US law and French law. However that positive driver remains weaker than the above mentioned negative driver i.e. the quantum of the claim.<br><br>Thirdly, claimants operating in mature industries have much better chance to be granted damages than those operating in more risky businesses such as high tech. This is very consistent across the three laws and it somehow contradicts the economic theory saying that risk should be compensated by higher damages for claimants operating in thin markets. One possible explanation is that those claimants in high tech industries are smaller than others and, as such, probably command less ability to evidence their lost profits.<br><br>The fourth and last result concerns specifically international commercial disputes resolution. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统上,对违约经济损失和补偿性损害赔偿的评估在两个实际困难之间徘徊:司法的不确定性和技术的复杂性。在缺乏客观数据的情况下,司法的不确定性尤其高。在有数据的情况下,目前的财务和统计方法在大多数情况下过于复杂和昂贵。这导致了低效率的谈判,不必要的诉讼和/或不可预测的司法判决。因此,需要一种比目前的定量方法既客观又简单的替代方法。其中一种方法是为某些类型的经济损失制定损害赔偿比额表,因为它们适用于人身伤害。一个好的开始方法是研究判例法,并调查可以作为不同类型经济损害判例的裁决。我们选择了三种类型的商业情况,我们认为使用简单的定量方法与评估损害最相关:违反谈判协议,损害商业信誉,新业务的利润损失。对于每一种情况,我们依次设计了我们正在寻找的结果的假设,开发了一个具有事实特定标准的模板,搜索并确定了数百个相关案例,并建立了一个全面的数据库。然后,我们使用数据库来验证或修正最初的假设,以确定模式或相关性,并建议损害范围或规模。我们观察到基本指标的一致性:胜率和回收率。法国法律的趋势是上升的,美国法律的趋势是下降的,但它们都趋向于相似的速度。国际法规定的税率略高。然而,我们也观察到这些指标的平均值存在很大的偏差。迄今为止进行的实证分析使我们得出四个主要论点,即案例如何以及为什么偏离平均水平。第一个论点是,原告索赔金额与赔偿率之间存在明显的负相关关系。这三条定律中的大多数情况都是如此。索赔和辩护之间的差距随着索赔的增加而扩大,因此法院的判决逻辑上反映了这一更大的差距。这也可能表明,法院最终将批准的补偿性损害赔偿存在一个“心理”上限。在法院提及被告恶意的情况下,给予原告极高的赔偿,也不能排除“隐性惩罚性赔偿”。其次,索赔人使用的方法的复杂性与该索赔人案件的成功结果之间存在正相关关系。索赔人为支持其索赔而开发的复杂方法在逻辑上对胜率和回收率有积极影响。这在美国法律和法国法律的所有三种情况下都是正确的。然而,该积极驱动因素仍然弱于上述消极驱动因素,即权利要求的数量。第三,在成熟行业经营的索赔人比在高风险行业(如高科技行业)经营的索赔人获得赔偿的机会要大得多。这在三个法律中是非常一致的,它在某种程度上与经济学理论相矛盾,即在薄弱市场经营的索赔人应该通过更高的赔偿来补偿风险。一种可能的解释是,高科技行业的索赔人比其他行业的索赔人要小,因此,可能没有能力证明他们的利润损失。第四个也是最后一个结果具体涉及国际商事纠纷的解决。更大的案件仍被提交仲裁法庭;然而,在我们的样本中,国家法院在给予损害赔偿方面似乎比仲裁法庭更为慷慨。后一种结果在某种程度上与普遍认为仲裁法庭比国家法院更不愿意作出大额裁决的看法相矛盾。总之,我们表明参考范围可以从观察到的合同损害赔偿的先例中建立。我们认为,这样的范围可能有利于学术辩论和当事人的律师在他们的合同起草或诉讼前和解。我们建议对某些类型的合同损害进行持续的实证研究,最终可能导致共享和更新赔偿尺度,法院和法官随后将其用作辅助其裁决的工具。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Criteria Influencing the Damages Granted as a Remedy for Contract Breach
The assessment of economic loss and compensatory damages for contract breach has traditionally navigated between two practical difficulties: judicial uncertainty and technical complexity. Judicial uncertainty is particularly high when objective data are missing. And when data exist, current financial and statistical methodologies are too complex and costly for most cases. This leads to inefficient bargaining, unnecessary litigations and/or unpredictable judicial decisions.

Hence there is a need for alternative methods that are both objective and simpler than current quantitative methods. One of those methods would be to develop damages scales for certain types of economic losses as they exist for personal injury. A good way to start is to study case law and to survey rulings that can be used as precedents for different classes of economic damages.

We have selected three types of business situations where we think the use of simple quantitative methods is most relevant to assess damages: breach of an agreement to negotiate, damage to commercial reputation, lost profits for a new business. For each of those situations we successively designed hypothesis of the findings we were looking for, developed a template with fact specific criteria, searched and identified several hundreds of relevant cases and built a comprehensive database. We then used the database to validate or amend the initial hypothesis, to identify patterns or correlations and to suggest damage ranges or scales.

We observe a certain consistency for the basic metrics: win rate and recovery rate. The trends are upward in French law and downward in American law but they both converge towards similar rates. International law gives slightly higher rates. However we also observe wide deviations from those metrics averages. The performed empirical analysis to-date leads us to four main arguments as to how and why cases deviate from the average.

The first argument is a clear negative correlation between the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim and the recovery rate. This is true for most situations in all three laws. The gap between claim and defense widens when claim increases, so court decision logically reflects this wider gap. That may also indicates there is a “psychological” ceiling for the compensatory damages courts will eventually grant. “Hidden punitive damages” cannot be excluded either when extremely high damages are granted to plaintiffs while courts mention bad faith of defendants.

Secondly, there is a positive correlation between the sophistication of the methodology used by the claimant and the successful outcome of the case for that claimant. Sophistication of the methodology developed by the claimant in support of her claim has logically a positive impact on the win rate and the recovery rate. This is true in all three situations for US law and French law. However that positive driver remains weaker than the above mentioned negative driver i.e. the quantum of the claim.

Thirdly, claimants operating in mature industries have much better chance to be granted damages than those operating in more risky businesses such as high tech. This is very consistent across the three laws and it somehow contradicts the economic theory saying that risk should be compensated by higher damages for claimants operating in thin markets. One possible explanation is that those claimants in high tech industries are smaller than others and, as such, probably command less ability to evidence their lost profits.

The fourth and last result concerns specifically international commercial disputes resolution. Larger cases are still brought before arbitral tribunals; however, in our sample, national courts seem more generous in granting damages than arbitral tribunals. This latter result somehow contradicts the common belief that arbitral tribunals are less reluctant than national courts to grant large awards.

In conclusion, we show that reference ranges can be built from observed precedents of contract damages. We claim such ranges may benefit the academics debate and the parties’ attorneys in their contract drafting or pre-litigation settlement. We suggest continuous empirical research on certain types of contracts damages could eventually lead to shared and updated compensatory scales which courts and judges would then use as tools to assist their rulings.
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