我们所知的成本分配的终结

Marc Hodak
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引用次数: 7

摘要

一个多世纪以来,成本分配问题一直困扰着世界各地的管理层。而且,由于运营管理层和总部之间的“信息不对称”和代理冲突,尚无明确的理论解决方案。尽管如此,分配成本还是有很好的理由的。如果结构合理,转让定价方案可以达到与市场价格相同的目的。通过传递有关组织内资源相对稀缺的有用信息,它们可以用来平衡定价的产品或服务的供求关系。1997年,摩根士丹利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The End of Cost Allocations as We Know Them
Cost allocation issues have befuddled management around the world for over a century. And, because of "informational asymmetries" and agency conflicts between operating management and headquarters, there is no clear theoretical solution to the problem. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for allocating costs. If properly structured, transfer-pricing schemes can serve the same purpose as a market price. By communicating useful information about the relative scarcity of resources within an organization, they can serve to balance supply and demand for the product or service being priced. 1997 Morgan Stanley.
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