玛丽·戴利的哲学:一些柏格森的主题

S. Kapusta
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文的主要目的是指出激进女权主义理论家玛丽·戴利的一些观点与法国哲学家亨利·柏格森的一些观点之间的密切相似之处。这些相似之处在两位作者对两种截然不同的认知能力——时间和暂时经验,以及自我和情感——所做的区分上尤为显著。戴利不同于柏格森,因为她以自己的方式运用了这些区别。她不像柏格森那样,用它们来描绘意识或生命的自然过程的结果,以及不适当尊重这些差异对人类自由和思想的危险。相反,她将这些差异置于一种更自由、更伦理的视角中,在女权主义创作运动与静态、固定、“固定”的父权制(带有“技术官僚”的自命)之间形成鲜明、敌对的对比。我希望强调戴利和柏格森之间的相似之处,将为欣赏和批评戴利的作品开辟新的道路。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mary Daly’s Philosophy: Some Bergsonian Themes
The primary goal of this article is point out certain close parallels between some ideas of the radical feminist theorist Mary Daly and those of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. These similarities are particularly striking regarding distinctions made by both authors between two fundamentally contrasting types of cognitive faculty, of time and temporal experience, and of self and emotion. Daly departs from Bergson inasmuch as she employs these distinctions in her own way. She does not—like Bergson—employ them to depict the result of a natural process of consciousness or life, and the dangers for human freedom and thought of not properly respecting these differences. Rather, she locates these differences within a more liberatory, ethical perspective to ground a sharp, inimical contrast between feminist creative movement on the one hand, and static, fixing, and “fixating” patriarchy, with its “technocratic” pretensions, on the other. My hope is that highlighting the similarities between Daly and Bergson will open new paths of appreciation and critique of Daly’s work.
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