{"title":"2021年2月的德克萨斯州深度冻结:发生了什么和吸取了教训?","authors":"P. Hartley, Kenneth Medlock III, E. Hung","doi":"10.5547/2160-5890.12.2.phar","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Extreme freezing temperatures, snow, and ice from winter storm Uri afflicted Texas February 1418, 2021. Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio saw record-low temperatures of 13, -2, and 5 °F. The power grid operated by Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which serves most Texas power consumers, came close to catastrophic failure. Millions of ERCOT customers suffered blackouts for multiple days. Although true electricity demand was not measured, forecasted demand matched mid-afternoon 4-hour August peak demands, but for 72 consecutive hours. Scapegoats for the widespread outages included wind generators, thermal generators, natural gas suppliers, Texas opposition to interconnections, ERCOT management, and ERCOT market rules. Although these various factors were blamed for the extended power outage on the ERCOT electricity grid in February 2021, no single problem fully explains the calamity. All forms of generation experienced capacity deratings, but failure to identify and address risks along fuel supply chains was a major contributor. Moreover, the vent highlighted a growing risk associated with expanded intermittent generation resources without sufficient available, dispatchable generation capacity.","PeriodicalId":194500,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Texas Deep Freeze of February 2021: What Happened and Lessons Learned?\",\"authors\":\"P. Hartley, Kenneth Medlock III, E. Hung\",\"doi\":\"10.5547/2160-5890.12.2.phar\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Extreme freezing temperatures, snow, and ice from winter storm Uri afflicted Texas February 1418, 2021. Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio saw record-low temperatures of 13, -2, and 5 °F. The power grid operated by Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which serves most Texas power consumers, came close to catastrophic failure. Millions of ERCOT customers suffered blackouts for multiple days. Although true electricity demand was not measured, forecasted demand matched mid-afternoon 4-hour August peak demands, but for 72 consecutive hours. Scapegoats for the widespread outages included wind generators, thermal generators, natural gas suppliers, Texas opposition to interconnections, ERCOT management, and ERCOT market rules. Although these various factors were blamed for the extended power outage on the ERCOT electricity grid in February 2021, no single problem fully explains the calamity. All forms of generation experienced capacity deratings, but failure to identify and address risks along fuel supply chains was a major contributor. Moreover, the vent highlighted a growing risk associated with expanded intermittent generation resources without sufficient available, dispatchable generation capacity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":194500,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy\",\"volume\":\"136 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.12.2.phar\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.12.2.phar","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Texas Deep Freeze of February 2021: What Happened and Lessons Learned?
Extreme freezing temperatures, snow, and ice from winter storm Uri afflicted Texas February 1418, 2021. Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio saw record-low temperatures of 13, -2, and 5 °F. The power grid operated by Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which serves most Texas power consumers, came close to catastrophic failure. Millions of ERCOT customers suffered blackouts for multiple days. Although true electricity demand was not measured, forecasted demand matched mid-afternoon 4-hour August peak demands, but for 72 consecutive hours. Scapegoats for the widespread outages included wind generators, thermal generators, natural gas suppliers, Texas opposition to interconnections, ERCOT management, and ERCOT market rules. Although these various factors were blamed for the extended power outage on the ERCOT electricity grid in February 2021, no single problem fully explains the calamity. All forms of generation experienced capacity deratings, but failure to identify and address risks along fuel supply chains was a major contributor. Moreover, the vent highlighted a growing risk associated with expanded intermittent generation resources without sufficient available, dispatchable generation capacity.