PT-Guard:完整性保护的页表,以防御突破滚锤攻击

A. Saxena, Gururaj Saileshwar, Jonas Juffinger, Andreas Kogler, D. Gruss, Moinuddin K. Qureshi
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引用次数: 2

摘要

页表在系统中强制进程隔离。Rowhammer攻击通过翻转DRAM中的位来篡改页表并实现特权升级来打破进程隔离。此外,新的Rowhammer攻击打破了现有的缓解措施。我们寻求保护系统免受此类突破性攻击。我们提出PT-Guard,一种页表的完整性保护机制。PT-Guard使用页表项(PTE)中未使用的位为PTE缓存嵌入消息认证码(MAC),而不需要任何存储开销。这些未使用的位来自支持pb级物理内存的pte,而Rowhammer针对的系统最多使用tb级内存。通过存储和验证pte的mac, PT-Guard可以检测pte中的任意位翻转。此外,PT-Guard还利用值局部性提供了对错误pte的最大努力校正。PT-Guard保护页表免受突破性的Rowhammer攻击,硬件更改可以忽略不计,没有DRAM存储,<72字节的SRAM, 1.3%的速度减缓,没有软件更改。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
PT-Guard: Integrity-Protected Page Tables to Defend Against Breakthrough Rowhammer Attacks
Page tables enforce process isolation in systems. Rowhammer attacks break process isolation by flipping bits in DRAM to tamper page tables and achieving privilege escalation. Moreover, new Rowhammer attacks break existing mitigations. We seek to protect systems against such breakthrough attacks. We present PT-Guard, an integrity protection mechanism for page tables. PT-Guard uses unused bits in Page Table Entries (PTE) to embed a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the PTE cacheline without any storage overhead. These unused bits arise from PTEs supporting petabytes of physical memory while systems targeted by Rowhammer use at-most terabytes of mem-ory. By storing and verifying MACs for PTEs, PT-Guard detects arbitrary bit-flips in PTEs. Moreover, PT-Guard also provides best-effort correction of faulty-PTEs leveraging value locality. PT-Guard protects page tables from breakthrough Rowhammer attacks with negligible hardware changes, no DRAM storage, <72 bytes of SRAM, 1.3% slowdown, and no software changes.
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