{"title":"项目组合经理是否与项目组合管理签订合同?","authors":"Jung Hoon Lee, Charles Trzcinka, Shyam Venkatesan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2844962","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"24","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?\",\"authors\":\"Jung Hoon Lee, Charles Trzcinka, Shyam Venkatesan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2844962\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.\",\"PeriodicalId\":412480,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"39 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"24\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2844962\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2844962","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do Portfolio Manager Contracts Contract Portfolio Management?
Most mutual fund managers have performance‐based contracts. Our theory predicts that mutual fund managers with asymmetric contracts and mid‐year performance close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As predicted by our theory, performance deviation from the benchmark decreases risk‐shifting only for managers with performance contracts. Deviation from the benchmark dominates incentives from the flow‐performance relation, suggesting that risk‐shifting is motivated more by management contracts than by a tournament to capture flows.
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